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Abstract
Cybersecurity attacks are on the rise, and a competent workforce able to face real-life
threats is urgently needed. Their training requires practical learning opportunities
and, in particular, hands-on exercises. Cyber Defense Exercises (CDX) can meet the
demand for realistic, hands-on training. Unfortunately, running a CDX requires ded-
icated infrastructures, namely Cyber Ranges, to host the training scenarios. Further-
more, building the computing infrastructure is only the first step. Indeed, the design,
verification, and deployment of scenarios are costly and error-prone activities. The
reason is that a misconfiguration in the scenario can compromise the exercise and
the training goals. The result is that CDX of real-world complexity are so expensive
that only a limited number of organizations can afford them.
In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing an effective and usable Cyber
Range capable of hosting training scenarios for the next generation of security ex-
perts. We start our investigation by reconsidering common training activities such
as Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions. In particular, we present our experience
with a non-formal training activity for university students that we organized. The
goal was to test the overall effectiveness of acquired skills and analyze the challenge
development process.
By leveraging this experience, we focus on the implementation of a Cyber Range.
We present CRACK, a framework for the (i) design, (ii) model-based verification,
(iii) generation, and (iv) automated testing of cyber scenarios. At the core of our
approach stands the Scenario Definition Language (SDL) that extends TOSCA, an
OASIS standard for the specification and orchestration of virtual cloud infrastruc-
tures. Our SDL allows for the defining and formally verifying specification of the
scenario elements and their interplay. Verified scenarios are automatically deployed
and tested to check if they are ready to be played.
Finally, we use our Cyber Range to create a scenario replicating a realistic system
involving the use of the emerging Fog computing paradigm. As a side effect of this
activity, we introduce DIOXIN, an extension of the considered Fog operating system
that mitigates found weaknesses.
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1.1 Context and Motivations
Each year, cybersecurity reports filed by governments [Sis19, UK 19], private companies [Mic20,
Che20a, Fir20], and non-profit organizations [ISA20, CLU20] review cyber incidents and pro-
vide key insights about the cyber threat landscape. Most of these reports agree that we are facing
a significant increment in the number and complexity of threats and make us suggest that no or-
ganization, big or small, is immune to a disruptive cyber attack. Moreover, the ability to prevent
or defend against such attacks is strongly linked to cybersecurity professionals’ readiness and
skills. These conditions result in an ever-growing demand for well trained security experts.
Practical learning opportunities are essential for cybersecurity operators to achieve an adequate
cyber risk awareness level and the skills to counter threats. In this sense, the European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) recommends including hands-on exercises as a good
practice in designing and implementing the cybersecurity strategy of nations [ENI16b].
Nowadays, the two most widely recognized hands-on activities in the field of cybersecurity train-
ing are piq Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions and piiq Cyber Defense Exercises (CDX), also
known as live-fire cyber exercises.
CTF competitions come in different shapes, e.g., Jeopardy [DEC`11] and Attack-and-Defense
(A/D) [TDG`17a]. Despite the format, CTFs feature a game-like approach and involve indi-
viduals or small teams solving challenges. Each challenge focuses on a specific topic, such as
Binary Exploitation, Reverse Engineering, Web Exploitation, Cryptography, or Forensics. Typi-
cally, challenges are made up of an artifact (e.g., an executable file, a network packets capture or
a filesystem image) or a single virtual machine running a vulnerable system. Solving these chal-
lenges represents an opportunity to learn hacking techniques (and necessary countermeasures),
strengthen problem-solving skills, and gain valuable hands-on practice. Some of the reasons why
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CTFs are becoming so popular are piq the variety of topics covered, piiq the gradual progression
in the exercise difficulty, piiiq the standardized ruleset, and pivq the few resources required to
host and run them. On the other hand, the main issue with CTFs is that they focus on a single
topic per time. Therefore, they are unable to cover the complexity of security assessments and
the comprehensive process of cyber defense.
CDXs [MLM`07, SO18] are exercises in which teams of participants (blue teams) manage and
defend a compound of realistic Information Technology (IT) and Operation Technology (OT)
infrastructures. These exercises enable to train operators to detect and mitigate large scale cyber-
attacks executed by specific teams (red teams) simulating hackers’ activities. The main difference
from CTFs lies in the complexity of the operational environment, namely the training scenario,
and the educational goals. In particular, CDXs emphasize realistic training scenarios and focus
on improving technical and soft skills, e.g., communication, teamwork, and decision-making
under stress, in the cybersecurity domain. For these reasons, they also allow organizations to
identify gaps and areas for development in their processes and technologies. Hosting and running
such exercises require specialized infrastructures, namely Cyber Ranges, providing the necessary
training environment.
Cyber Ranges can host highly realistic cyber exercises: large scale ICT infrastructures consisting
of hundreds of interconnected devices, each supporting the protocol stack, operating system, and
applications of choice can be emulated on commercial hardware or by leveraging virtualization
technologies. Cyber Ranges are being used to carry out large scale cyber exercises routinely.
A prominent example is the Locked Shields cyber exercise [CCD19], which NATO conducts on
a yearly basis since 2010. In Locked Shields, blue teams must defend a given (emulated) ICT
infrastructure from attacks performed by a red team. The emulated ICT infrastructures used in
Locked Shields consist of around four thousand virtualized systems and are executed by means
of a dedicated Cyber Range.
Currently, Cyber Ranges and CDXs are possibly the best hands-on training experience. Nev-
ertheless, these exercises are extremely resource-intensive and require a great deal of planning
before execution [Dew18]. As discussed in [VVO`17], implementing such a cyber exercise is the
result of a sequence of complex operations. Nowadays, these operations are mostly carried out
manually by security experts. The authors of [VVO`17] identify several factors behind the high
effort, time, and costs for creating a cyber exercise. Among them, the trial-and-error approach is
a major one.
The required implementation process is schematically depicted in Figure 1.1. The possible in-
puts are some initial requirements, usually consisting of a high-level, conceptual design or a
storyboard, being the result of a preliminary brainstorming. These elements drive the theater
design whose objective is the definition of the infrastructure hosting the cyber exercise. This
phase yields a blueprint of the theatre. The scenario design refines the blueprint by adding non-
infrastructural elements, e.g., vulnerabilities and (teams of) participants. Then, the objectives
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Figure 1.1: The scenario implementation process.
design introduces the goals and rules of the cyber exercise. All these phases require a valida-
tion step aiming at the detection and elimination of inconsistencies. Clearly, a failed validation
makes the design process backtrack to an earlier phase. Eventually, the validated blueprint of the
scenario reaches the scenario deployment phase. This operation translates the blueprint into a set
of directives which are fed to an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) [MG11] provider. The result
is a running infrastructure implementing the blueprint. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that
the actual system behaves as expected, i.e., it preserves the properties validated on the blueprint.
The main reasons are the lack of a formal semantics and the abstraction level of the model. The
first issue arises because an element of the blueprint is instantiated with a virtual machine run-
ning a real OS and real software. The second issue resides in the IaaS deployment approach
that requires making explicit some values that might be absent at the level of abstraction of the
blueprint, e.g., network addresses. For these reasons, the deployed scenario undergoes a testing
phase to check that the cyber exercises can be properly executed. When also the test validation
is passed, the scenario is ready for the execution.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis takes its cue from the importance of hands-on exercises to fill the shortage of cy-
ber security skills. First, we consider CTF competitions and their acknowledged effectiveness
in providing valuable hands-on experiences also with limited infrastructural and organizational
resources. These features make them the ideal training solution for organizations of all types and
sizes, including academic ones. Then, we review Cyber Ranges as they are currently the most
comprehensive and versatile systems to support organizations in training operators, identifying
and addressing gaps in the cybersecurity domain. In particular, we focus our attention on the
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hosted scenario which represents one of the key elements to maximize the outcome of such sys-
tems. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of Cyber Ranges not only as a training environment,
but also as resources for hosting security testbeds. To this aim, we use a Cyber Range to design
and deploy a realistic scenario and carry out a security evaluation against a connected, physical
device.
To assess our contribution, we detail the issues and the related research questions for each cov-
ered topic.
1.2.1 Training Security Skills: the ZenHackAcademy Experience
As previously discussed, cybersecurity attacks are on the rise, and the need for a competent
workforce is increasing. However, this huge demand is currently unsatisfied. This issue is often
referred to as the CyberSecurity Skills Shortage (CSSS), which ENISA analyzes in an annual
report that focuses on the status of cybersecurity education in the European Union [ENI16a].
Briefly, they explain that this shortage is due to a quantitative issue, i.e., the insufficient supply
of professionals to meet the requirements of the job market, but also to a qualitative one, i.e.,
the inadequacy of professional skills to meet the market’s needs. In particular, they argue that
“many of the current issues in cybersecurity education could be ameliorated by redesigning
educational and training pathways that define knowledge and skills that students should possess
upon graduation and after entering the labour market”.
The not-for-profit foundation Global Cyber Security Center summarizes in [Zan19] a year-long
exploratory research on CSSS. Like [ENI16a], they highlight that, between the correlates of the
shortage, the unqualified candidates is a prominent one. They also detail that the main factor
behind the CSSS is due to the education and training system and report that “simply put, most
educational institutions do not prepare students for a career in cybersecurity”.
For these reasons, the academic institutions must have a significant commitment in reducing the
CSSS. To this aim, they must design hands-on training activities in scenarios that are as close
as possible to the real-world ones. CTF challanges are a great opportunity to achieve this goal,
since they encourage students to think as an attacker does, thus creating more awareness on
the modalities and consequences of an attack. Unfortunately, changing the topics taught in a
university curriculum is not always an easy task, since curricula are often the result of much
different balances and mediation among faculty members. However, triggered by the valuable
outcomes of CTFs, in 2017 we introduced in our department some hands-on activities, outside
the official classes, and offered non-formal meetings on ethical hacking to expose students to
new trends and directions.
We distinguish between formal and non-formal according to the following definitions [Tob92].
Formal learning is official, structured, organized by public or private organizations and ends with
an official certification (e.g., university credits). On the other hand, non-formal education is any
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structured and organized learning which does not necessarily lead to recognized qualifications or
identified diplomas.
We report on a non-formal educational activity, discussing student recruitment, training orga-
nization, and results we achieved. In order to evaluate these aspects, we defined the following
research questions.
RQ1) Did this non-formal training help students in improving their competencies?
RQ2) Did this non-formal training increased students’ interest in cybersecurity?
1.2.2 Building Next Generation Cyber Ranges
Since the need of advanced cybersecurity training is now perceived by a wide audience (e.g.,
the civil sector), a number of Cyber Range solutions, both commercial (e.g., Cyber Range
in a Box [Bel14], Cyberbit Range [Cyb19], and NetWars [SAN19]) and open source (e.g.,
ADLES [CdLGHK18], CyRIS [BPT`18], and KYPO [VOC`17]), have recently been put for-
ward.
Most of these proposals rely on virtualization to support scalability and reconfigurability. Yet,
live-fire cyber exercises running against emulated ICT infrastructures of real-world complexity
can be afforded only by a limited number of organizations. As observed by [VVO`17], this is
mostly due to the fact that the design, development, and deployment of scenarios of real-world
complexity are error-prone, time-consuming activities that require the involvement of highly
specialized personnel. Such an effort is always necessary, since playing the same scenario more
than once drastically reduces its training effectiveness. Thus, although a large infrastructure
helps, the overall quality of a cyber exercise mostly depends on its good design.
To illustrate the level of complexity, consider the difficulty of installing the necessary software
and configuring each and every client, server, router, gateway in a scenario comprising hundreds
of such devices. In theory, the resulting infrastructure, namely the theater, can be developed by
means of existing infrastructure development frameworks (e.g., see Terraform [Has20], Ansi-
ble [Red20], Chef [Che20b], and Puppet [Pup20]). However, the theater is just the first step as
it must then be turned into an appropriate training scenario. This step is fraught of difficulties
as it requires, e.g., the injection of vulnerabilities (e.g., misconfigurations and software bugs),
the definition of the teams’ goals, and the testing of their actual reachability. For instance, the
injection of too many (or too easy to discover) vulnerabilities may lead to a scenario that can be
trivially solved, whereas the injection of too few (or too difficult to discover) vulnerabilities may
lead to a frustrating experience for the participants. Unfortunately, a mistake made during the
design may be discovered only at a later stage, e.g., during the development, the deployment or
even the execution of the scenario.
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The issues discussed above are summarized by the following research questions:
RQ3) Can (and to what extent) main-stream development methods for virtual infrastructures be
extended to support the development of Cyber Range scenarios?
RQ4) Can (and to what extent) state-of-the-art modeling and automated verification techniques
be used to drive the scenario development process?
RQ5) Can designers reuse (parts of) previously developed scenarios without compromising the
overall quality of the training activity?
1.2.3 Cyber Ranges on the Field
The effectiveness of cyber defenders to contain attacks has as the main cornerstone their hands-on
training. Nevertheless, the overall defense of an organization against cyberattacks, also known as
the cybersecurity posture, is an even more challenging process. In addition to the training activ-
ity, the cybersecurity posture encompasses the deployed security solutions, the security policies
in place, and the collective security status of all the installed software, hardware, network and
services.
Evaluating the cybersecurity posture of an organization become of paramount importance to
identify the attack surface along with the effectiveness and efficiency of the defensive mecha-
nisms. Notice that, a proper assessment relies also on the invasive testing of systems in produc-
tion, such as executing a Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Test (VAPT). Moreover, the
above tests must be performed as a regular basis and every time the system under evaluation is
updated with a new configuration or with a new component.
Unfortunately, there are many situations where invasive test on live systems is not advisable, even
when it is possible. For example, think about industrial cyber-physical systems, i.e., systems
where the operational technology is integrated with traditional IT infrastructures. A fully VAPT
includes potentially disruptive actions, e.g., exploiting vulnerabilites or performing denial-of-
service attacks, and executing it against these systems can certainly highlight the security gaps
but also create unwanted interruptions to the manufacturing activity. For these reasons, many
times the cybersecurity posture assessment is incomplete and limited in recurrence so resulting
inaccurate and ineffective.
Considering the features offered by Cyber Ranges and the issues presented above we propose the
following research question:
RQ6) Are Cyber Ranges flexible enough to support the security assessment of critical assets by
replicating their production environment?
.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 - Training Security Skills: the ZenHackAcademy Experience
In this chapter, we introduce CTFs and detail our experience in using them as hands-
on during an academic educational activity on the cybersecurity topic. First, we re-
view the main features of CTFs and the different formats of their challenges. Then,
we describe the training approach we have used and how we have integrated it with
the traditional academic classes. Finally, we present the results that have been sum-
marized from the survey submitted to the students who participated in this activity.
Chapter 3 - Building Next Generation Cyber Ranges
In this chapter, we introduce Cyber Ranges with a particular focus on their training
scenario. We start by describing a case study and the working example. Then, we
recall some preliminary notions, and we present our Scenario Definition Language.
The above notions and SDL are required for introducing CRACK, our framework
for cyber scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate and evaluate the framework.
Chapter 4 - Cyber Ranges on the Field
In this chapter, we examine Cyber Ranges as facilities to host testbeds for perform-
ing security assessments. In particular, we focus on testing Cisco IOx, a mainstream
operating system used in Fog Computing deployments. First, we introduce some
background on Fog Computing and Cisco IOx. Then, we extend the case study in-
troduced in the previous chapter adding components for executing a smart irrigation
system. This scenario allowed us to test the security model of Cisco IOx and high-
light the main weaknesses. To mitigate the found issues, we present DIOXIN, our
proposal to improve the security of Cisco IOx through runtime monitoring. Finally,
we validate the effectiveness of our proposal using the same testbed hosted by the
Cyber Range.
Chapter 5 - Related Work
In this chapter, we present related work. First, we compare the ZenHackademy expe-
rience with other activities involving hands-on exercises. Then, we discuss solutions
comparable to our CRACK framework. Finally, we compare DIOXIN with other
proposals introducing policies and runtime monitoring in IoT and Fog deployments.
Chapter 6 - Conclusions
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Chapter 2
Training Security Skills: the
ZenHackAcademy Experience
In this chapter we detail the different formats and rules of CTFs (Section 2.1). Then we present
how we introduced these competitions and related exercises in our academic institution (Sec-
tion 2.2). Finally, we discuss the lesson learned from this experience (Section 2.3).
2.1 Capture The Flag competitions
Below, we list the main formats for CTF competitions.
Jeopardy. This competitions [CBB14, FSHB17] involve multiple categories of challenges,
each of which contains a vulnerability. Participants, often grouped into teams, must exploit these
vulnerabilities to find hidden flags, i.e., strings in a given format. The knowledge of a flag proves
that the corresponding challenge has been successfully solved. Participants do not directly attack
each other. They enroll into an online platform to access the challenges and submit the found
flags to gain points. Jeopardy CTFs have a fixed duration, which is usually from one to a few
consecutive days. Competitions in this format allow students to think adversariarly [HHM`17],
i.e., to think as an attacker would, and this form of gamification motivates them to learn by doing.
Attack/Defense (A/D). In A/D CTFs, teams run an identical machine, or a small network,
injected with vulnerable services. In this format, the goal of each team is to find and exploit
the vulnerabilities in opponent’ machines, while fixing or mitigating flaws in their own. Unlike
jeopardy CTFs, flags associated to vulnerable services are dynamic. The scoring sytem, namely
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the scoring bot, updates them regularly and teams lose points if their services are not up when the
scoring bot contacts them. On the other hand, compromising a service of other machines enables
a team to steal the corresponding hidden flags and gain points. All in all, the score is computed
considering the services availability together with the number of stolen flags. A/D CTFs last a
few hours and usually teams can take advantage of extra time before the start of the competition
to analyze services and patch found flaws. Although A/D CTFs are more demanding to play,
they allow participants to gain experience with both offensive and defensive related skills.
King of the Hill (KotH). KotH CTFs [BHL18] differs from A/D format as the teams do not
run their own machine. Instead of individual machines, a KotH CTF relies on a central set of
servers. Teams need to identify vulnerability of the above server and find out how to exploit
them. After taking the control of a system, a team must be able to prevent other participants to
hacking it and scoring points.
Build-it/Break-it/Fix-it (BIBIFI). BIBIFI CTFs [RHP`16, WCC18] ask build-it teams to
write software, which is subsequently attacked by break-it teams. BIBIFI competition consist
of three phases. The first one, namely build-it, requires small development teams to build soft-
ware according to a given specification that includes security goals. The second phase, namely
break-it, requires teams to find defects in other teams’ submissions. Reported defects benefit the
break-it team’s score and penalize the build-it team’s score. The final phase, namely fix-it, asks
builders to fix bugs and thereby get some points back.
In all formats of CTFs, a dynamic scoreboard shows the progress of the contest, listing the teams
and their scores. At the end of the competition, the scoreboard is frozen, and the top three teams
are listed as winners.
Then, a phase dedicated to the publication of write-ups follows. Who resolved a given challenge
can write a short post and detail the steps of the adopted solution. From a training perspective,
this task is of primary importance. On the one hand, participants can improve reporting skills
arranging and summarizing their solutions. On the other hand, it allows to compare different
techniques applied to solve the same challenge.
The reference website for the CTF competitions is CTFtime [CTF20]. In particular, it constantly
updates a list of the past, current, and future events. For each CTF competition, a difficulty score
is assigned. The difficulty score is computed by evaluating some parameters such as players’
feedback and the scores of the teams. All the registered teams participate in a global ranking.
After every CTF, a team receives new points corresponding to their score in the CTF normalized
according to the overall difficulty score.
Table 2.1 shows CTFtime statistics for the years from 2015 to 2019. In particular, we report the
number of CTFs, the registered teams, and registered academic teams, i.e., teams affiliated with
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Table 2.1: CTFtime statistics.
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CTFs 79 107 141 153 198
Teams 7271 10590 14983 18237 24555
Academic Teams 327 499 659 826 1045
academic institutions.
The numbers of Table 2.1 show that the interest about CTF competitions has been constantly
growing over the last years. Moreover, they highlight that more and more universities create
their own teams.
2.2 The ZenHackAdemy
ZenHack is a CTF team we founded in 2017 and made up of students and researchers interested
in cybersecurity. The team is based in Genova1, Italy, and is hosted by the Department of In-
formatics, Bioengineering, Robotics, and Systems Engineering (DIBRIS) of the University of
Genova.
Besides participating in competitions as an academic team, our activity in ZenHack aims to foster
practical skills in cybersecurity. In particular, having experienced the educational potential of
CTFs, we considered proposing challenges as hands-on training to the undergraduate students.
As anticipated in Section 1.2.1, modifying the content of official curricula is a difficult and time-
consuming process. For this reason, in October 2017, we decided to assess the interests in CTF
topics and the effectiveness of their exercises by starting some non-formal training, outside offi-
cial lectures. To manage all these activities, organized with the help and expertise of ZenHack,
we created the ZenHackAdemy.
In Section 2.2.1, we present how we organized the first pilot of the ZenHackAdemy. In Sec-
tion 2.2.2, we detail the second edition and refinements based on the previous experience.
2.2.1 Autumn 2017, first pilot
We scheduled a calendar of weekly meetings reserving a slot without official courses. Lessons
was organized to cover different topics, ranging from web security to binary analysis, from net-
1The dialect name of Genoa is Zena
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work analysis to cryptography. Each session included a brief theoretical introduction on the topic
of the lesson and a discussion on how to solve some of the related challenges.
Participation was somewhat encouraging with around 50 participants during the first meeting. As
expected, this number decreased over time when the complexity of the covered topics increased.
At the end of the training path, we organized an on-site Jeopardy CTF event. We choose
CTFd [Chu20] as the platform for hosting the local CTF. CTFd is an open-source software de-
signed to support CTF organizers handling exercises publication, participants enrollment, and
flags submission.
Thirty-two students attended the first on-site CTF that lasted for few hours and exposed them
to solve challenges on the topics covered during the training path. The winner was a 2nd-year
bachelor student in Computer Engineering with no prior experience in computer security.
Finally, as a noteworthy result, some of the participating students joined us in the ZenHack team.
2.2.2 Autumn 2018, second edition
At the beginning of the academic year 2018/19, we re-proposed the activities of the ZenHack-
Ademy trying to strengthen the experience of the previous year, as described below.
Students enrollment. In the Autumn 2018, once again, we scheduled a 10-week non-formal
training supported by the ZenHackAdemy. In this academic year, we were able to reach a large
number of students w.r.t. first pilot. In particular, the holder of the Computer Security course
recognized the importance of such hands-on activities and decided to add this non-formal training
as a companion to the official track.
Lectures organization. In this second edition, we published all the exercises on a CTFd in-
stance dedicated to the training activity. Thus, students could practice with the platform of the
final CTF from the beginning of the learning path. At the same time, we were able to track
their involvement and progress. In detail, analyzing the CTFd data, we have determined that 126
students registered to the platform, and 90 were effectively active and tried to submit some flags.
Activities started on October 2018, according to the schedule shown in Table 2.2.
In the first lesson, we introduced the importance of ethics and legislation when practicing ethical
hacking. Then, we presented some basic Linux commands and tools that can be useful for solving
challenges. We closed the lesson proposing exercises for practicing the lateral thinking [DBZ70],
a necessary mindset for dealing with CTF exercises.
The second meeting focused on network security and forensics. In particular, we presented
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Table 2.2: Calendar of the activities, Autumn 2018.
12/10 Ethical hacking and Linux basics
19/10 Network security and forensics
26/10 Web security (client-side)
09/11 Basics on machine learning
16/11 Basics on cryptography
23/11 Exercises
30/11 Web security (server-side)
07/12 Binary analysis
14/12 Binary analysis (cnt.)
20/12 Final on-site CTF
Wireshark [the20i], a mainstream network protocol analyzer. The challenges to solve consisted
of finding flags on network traffic captures.
We scheduled two meetings on web security to present both client-side vulnerabilities, e.g.,
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), and server-side ones, e.g., SQL Injection (SQLi). For each of the
above class of vulnerabilities, students performed attacks on the Google Gruyere [Goo20] plat-
form.
In this edition, we also decided to cover some basics of machine learning, particularly an intro-
duction to adversarial machine learning [HJN`11]. We provided the students with challenges
proving how to fool simple classifiers.
We dedicated a lesson to cryptography by introducing the underlying principles. The proposed
challenges consisted of breaking simple encryption schemes that are improperly implemented.
Finally, we devoted the last two meetings to a brief introduction to the binary reversing of Linux
executables. The first meeting covered executable “life-cycle”, i.e., how binaries are linked and
loaded, and some basics of disassembly process. In the second meeting, we covered the corner-
stone of reverse engineering binaries. This was mainly carried out by leveraging some tools for
dynamic analysis, e.g., strace, ltrace and gdb.
On-site CTF. On December 20th 2018, we organized the on-site CTF having four prizes for
first places. Out of the 90 students active on the training platform, 71 took part in the local CTF,
22 of which enrolled in the Computer Security course.
We prepared 21 exercises in all categories introduced during the training. Challenges were of two
different types. Seven of them were specific for the students who have attended the Computer Se-
curity course. Their score was static, i.e., 10 points each. All remaining exercises used dynamic
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scores, i.e., the score started from 500 points and was decremented with each new submitted
solution.
Figure 2.1: Final scoreboard.
Figure 2.1 shows the final scoreboard, with the top 10 participants and their progress during the
CTF. In particular, only 1 out of the top 4 winners belong to Computer Security students and
nobody else in the top 10 participants.
2.3 Results
We administered a short anonymous survey consisting of multiple-choice questions, 5-point scale
questions, and a final open-ended question for any feedback.
We received 36 responses that correspond to the 40% of our sample, considering the 90 active
students on the training platform. Below we detail the most relevant questions and the related
answers.
A question (SQ1) of the survey asks students why they attended ZenHackAdemy activities and
proposes two different answers: 1) mandatory, for Computer Security students, and 2) interested
in the topic, for all the students. Respondents could select both answers, and 13 (36%) of them
declared to be Computer Security students, but 31 out of 36 (86%) selected the second option
A second question (SQ2) concerns the background of respondents, 20 (55%) did not have any
prior experience in the field.
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Two questions (SQ3 and SQ4) concerned the participation in the CTFs. In particular, 31 out
of the 36 (86%) respondents participated in the on-site CTF, and 16 (44%) declare they will
participate in other CTFs in the future, 9 (25%) would like, but they have no time, and only 2
declare they will not.
We formulated two questions (SQ5 and SQ6) that asked students to self-assess their competence
on the topics of the lessons (see Section 2.2.2) before and after the ZenHackAdemy activities.
Figure 2.2 shows on the top how participants self-evaluated themselves on different topics, based
on their prior knowledge, and, on the bottom, their self-evaluation on the same topics after the
training.
Figure 2.2: Students self-evaluations before the training (top) and after the training (bottom).
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Moreover, we asked (SQ7) “How did ZenHackAdemy activities influence your opinion on: (a)
Computer Security, (b) Ethical Hacking, (c) CTF, (d) ZenHackAdemy meetings?”. Figure 2.3
shows the answers.
Figure 2.3: Students’ opinions on Computer Security, Ethical Hacking, CTF, ZenHackAdemy
meetings.
Answer to RQ1 By comparing the results of SQ5 and SQ6 summarized in Figure 2.2, we
can notice an overall improvement concerning the skills of the participants. In particular, we
observe that there is a shift towards an average or good level of self-evaluation. Moreover, only
a small number of participants declare to know nothing (none) on the topics proposed in the
list after our lessons. We can indeed claim that the non-formal meetings of the ZenHackAdemy
allowed students to improve their skills: some learned new concepts, others improved their prior
understanding.
Answer to RQ2 Results of the questions SQ1 and SQ2 show that this non-formal training
is attractive regardless of whether they are mandatory with official courses and having a priori
knowledge on the cybersecurity subjects. Answers to the questions SQ1 and SQ2 reported that
lessons had motivated a significant number of students to participate in CTFs. The results sum-
marized in Figure 2.3 highlight an overall positive impression on the proposed topics. All in




Building Next Generation Cyber Ranges
with CRACK
Cyber Ranges are the state-of-the-art systems for hands-on cybersecurity training. Their success
is mainly due to their capability to support scenarios of high complexity and realism. However,
as detailed in Section 1.2.2, creating such scenarios is a demanding process and requires highly
specialized personnel. For this reason, Cyber Ranges can only be used by a limited number of
organizations and often without exploiting the full capabilities of these systems.
In this chapter we present the Cyber Range Automated Construction Kit (CRACK). CRACK sup-
ports the piq design, piiq automated verification and piiiq automated testing of complex Cyber
Range scenarios of real-world complexity. CRACK covers all the phases of the scenario devel-
opment process as we detail below.
Design. We define CRACK SDL, a Scenario Definition Language based on TOSCA [OAS19],
an infrastructure specification language standardized by OASIS. As we will see, specifications
expressed in CRACK SDL can be readily composed and reused and this greatly simplifies the
design process. Moreover, since CRACK SDL is an extension of TOSCA, its integration with
the existing infrastructure design technologies comes with no additional effort.
Verification. The CRACK SDL type system allows for the automatic verification of the scenar-
ios against several design errors, e.g., incorrect hardware/software bindings. More importantly,
we show how a CRACK SDL specification can be translated into a corresponding Datalog spec-
ification which can be automatically checked by off-the-shelf Datalog engines. This allows the
user to verify the CRACK SDL specifications against the training objectives.
Deployment. We show how a CRACK SDL specification is automatically translated into a
sequence of instructions for a virtualization environment. Executing these instructions leads to
the fully automated instantiation of all the elements of the scenario. As we will see, this process
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Figure 3.1: Case study infrastructure.
can take place on any TOSCA-compatible infrastructure virtualization platform.
Testing. We show that verification traces generated by the Datalog engine can be automati-
cally turned into test cases for the scenario. The execution of the test cases checks whether the
properties verified on the SDL specification (cf. Verification) are also enjoyed by the scenario at
runtime.
As a further contribution, we introduce a case study involving four scenarios based on the same
infrastructure and sharing the same goal (i.e., data exfiltration). Yet, the scenarios are affected
by distinct vulnerabilities that allow for different training objectives. The case study and, in
particular, Scenario 1 will be used as a working example throughout the chapter in order to
illustrate the functionalities of CRACK. Also, we use the experimental results to answer the
research questions of Section 1.2.2 and to confirm the effectiveness of our approach.
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3.1 Case Study: ACME Corp
In this section, we introduce ACME Corp, a case study based on a fictional ICT infrastructure
depicted in Figure 3.1. It consists of a segmented network where each segment hosts services
and devices related to a specific task: (i) Server contains the internal services (i.e., not meant to
be publicly accessible), (ii) DMZ contains the public services (i.e., exposed to the outside world)
and (iii) IoT connects field devices (i.e., sensors, actuators and controllers). These three networks
lay behind a firewall protecting the perimeter of the company. The firewall is intentionally left
open toward the DMZ to allow remote connections. A domain name server (DNS), called ns,
translates the symbolic names of the DMZ hosts into their actual IP addresses. The infrastructure
is connected to the public Internet through the backbone of the Internet service provider.
The infrastructure of Figure 3.1 is the stage for the execution of four scenarios. All of them
involve a blue team and a red team. The blue team has the generic goal to protect the ACME
Corp assets (e.g., data and services). The red team has the specific goal to exfiltrate data from
the private database residing on db. Playing the role of the ACME Corp IT security department,
the blue team has full access to the internal network, whereas the red team has only access to the
public Internet through a remote client machine.
We briefly discuss the four scenarios below.
Scenario 1 (Host Security 1) In this scenario the red team can achieve its goal by exploiting
some security weaknesses in the configuration of the www server, including:
1. www hosts a Content Management System (CMS) that uses the administrator creden-
tials [The20b] for authenticating to the Database Management System (DBMS) running
on db.
2. www runs an HTTP server exposing the home directories of the users; this enables a
dictionary-based enumeration of the existing accounts [The20d].
3. One of the enumerable users of www has a weak password, i.e., a password that is subject
to brute-force attack [The20e].
4. The administrator of www is exposed to an Escalation of Privileges (EoP) vulnerabil-
ity [The20g]. An EoP vulnerability allows the attacker to acquire the privileges of the
administrator.
Scenario 2 (Web Security) In this case, the red team can exploit the weaknesses given below.
1. Same as in Scenario 1.
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2. The remote debugging interface of the CMS is active, so allowing for Python commands
injection [Pal20].
3. The application server runs with unnecessary administrator privileges [The20b], so expos-
ing the database access credentials.
Scenario 3 (Host Security 2) In this scenario, the red team can exploit the following weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities of the www server.
1. Same as in Scenario 1.
2. www runs a version of the PHP interpreter suffering from a Remote Code Execution (RCE)
vulnerability [The19d] that, e.g., allows the attacker to create a backdoor on www.
Scenario 4 (Network Security) In the last scenario, the red team can achieve the goal exploit-
ing the following misconfigurations and vulnerabilities.
1. www runs an Apache server with an active HTTP reverse proxy module [The20a]. The
module is misconfigured to be an open proxy [The20c], i.e., it forwards HTTP requests
from the Internet to the internal servers, e.g., connected to the Server network.
2. db runs a version of the Webmin [Cam00] software suffering from a RCE vulnerabil-
ity [The19e].
In the rest of the chapter we only focus on some of the elements discussed above. In particular,
we only consider the part of the infrastructure highlighted in Figure 3.1. We will use it and
Scenario 1 as the working example through the chapter. In Section 3.5.4, we will discuss the
effort needed to design the other scenarios by reusing (parts of) Scenario 1.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recall the notions that are relevant for correctly understanding the
content of the chapter.
3.2.1 Cyber ranges and training
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technologies [NIS18] Cyber Ranges are
“interactive, [. . . ] representations of an organization’s local network, system, tools, and applica-
tions that are connected to a simulated Internet level environment.” The goal of a Cyber Range
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Figure 3.2: Cyber Range logical scheme.
is to “provide a safe, legal environment to gain hands-on cyber skills and a secure environment
for product development and security posture testing.”
In the spirit of the above definition, in this work, we propose a logical structure of a generic
Cyber Range. Such a structure is depicted in Figure 3.2. The management facilities support the
planning and execution of the activities conducted within the Cyber Range. This may imply the
monitoring of the Cyber Range activities possibly driving their evolution along a given story line.
The hands-on training is carried out within an infrastructure, consisting of a pool of (virtualized)
networks, computers, and applications hosted by some provider. We call such an infrastructure
the theater. Intuitively, we consider part of the theater all the elements that are not specific to the
training objectives, i.e., any object that is passively or marginally involved in the current exercise.
For instance, the routing infrastructure of a layered network architecture, being only responsible
for the exchange of messages, is a part of the theater.
On top of the theater, the scenario is the collection of all the items that are relevant for the hands-
on activity. It is worth noticing that a neat distinction between theater and scenario does not
exist in general (e.g., in terms of the involved technologies). In fact, the very same object can be
part of either the theater or the scenario depending on its role in the exercise. Nevertheless, the
distinction is useful to better characterize the role of the elements appearing in a cyber exercise.
Although it is not a general rule, a typical scenario involves some applications, e.g., a remote
shell or a CMS. Such applications are customized with configurations, e.g., the remote authenti-
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cation method, and artifacts, e.g., an authentication key, that plays a role in the scenario. Simi-
larly, user accounts can be included. A user can be related to all of the elements mentioned above,
e.g., the administrator of a service (application) has also access to its files (artifacts and configu-
rations). Finally, vulnerabilities must be injected to enable the attackers’ exploits. Vulnerabilities
are a cornerstone of every scenario and they can involve any of the elements discussed above,
e.g., a user setting a weak password or an application failing in sanitizing an input.
Beside the scenario and the theater, the gameplay facilities, i.e., the scoring and rule systems as
well as the team support, must be implemented. For instance, in a scenario some servers cannot
be attacked (engagement rules) or the blue team loses points when a certain service becomes
unavailable (service level agreement). Similarly, the teams may be required to operate through
some terminals that only provide a limited number of security tools. These elements cannot be
developed once for all as they are scenario-dependent. Nevertheless, they can be occasionally
reused, e.g., the same scoring system might apply to a certain category of exercises. Although
they are not properly part of the theater, these elements must be also included in the Cyber Range.
Since in this work we deal with the design and verification of the scenarios, we only focus on the
part of the elements of Figure 3.2. In particular, we will reason about the scenario elements (light
gray boxes). Moreover, we will discuss the infrastructure provider technologies that support the
deployment of theaters and scenarios. Instead, we will skip the presentation of the management
and gameplay elements (dashed boxes).
3.2.2 Infrastructure provisioning
In this section, we briefly recall the two infrastructure provisioning paradigms involved in our
proposal.
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) IaaS [MG11] aims at providing a flexible and reconfig-
urable infrastructure development platform. In particular, an IaaS provider allows for a direct
control over machines, operating systems, applications, and networking. By relying on virtu-
alization technologies, IaaS platforms hide the underlying, physical infrastructure (a.k.a. bare-
metal).
In a Cyber Range, each theater consists of many different elements including hosts (e.g., servers
and desktop clients), software (e.g., operating systems and applications) and network facilities
(e.g., routers and firewalls). Conveniently, IaaS providers expose APIs for creating, deleting, and
reconfiguring these elements. This makes IaaS a suitable paradigm for defining and deploying
a Cyber Range theater. In this setting, the building blocks of any theater are virtual machines
(for computing and storage) and virtual switches, routers, networks, and network ports (for im-
plementing the network infrastructure). Although some elements may not allow virtualization, a
virtual network can also be connected with some physical resources outside the IaaS platform.
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Figure 3.3: Layered view of the case study theater deployed over an IaaS provider.
For instance, an infrastructure can be connected to the Internet through a gateway.
Figure 3.3 represents the deployment of the theater of our case study (see Section 3.1) on an IaaS
provider. Briefly, the deployment proceeds bottom-up and each layer contributes to the instanti-
ation of the above ones. We use transparency to denote that items residing at a higher layer are
accessible to the layers below, e.g., the monitoring system can access the theater elements. In-
stead, lower layers are accessible only if they expose some functionalities, e.g., the management
network is open to monitoring and scoreboard.
All the elements of the theater are virtual with the only exception of the Internet which is only
partially simulated. The real Internet is accessible through a gateway that directly connects to
the external network. Moreover, the IaaS supports for the virtualization of part of the Cyber
Range facilities, such as the scoreboard and rule monitoring services. These facilities stay on a
different layer as they are not accessible from within the theater. Instead, they operate through
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a management network that is responsible for the cross-layer connectivity. Such connectivity is
necessary to orchestrate the theater, i.e., to create and configure the virtual infrastructure.
Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) On an IaaS provider, instantiating the infrastructure as in Sec-
tion 3.1 requires the following operations.
1. Create the virtual networks, e.g., Server and DMZ.
2. Create all the virtual machines, e.g., db and www.
3. Connect each virtual machine to the proper networks, e.g., db to Server.
4. Install all the operating systems and applications, e.g., DBMS on db.
5. Finalize the infrastructure by adding configurations, artifacts, and users.
All these operations are carried out by submitting the corresponding commands, e.g., via some
APIs, to the IaaS provider. Nevertheless, as the complexity of the infrastructure increases, han-
dling these design and deployment operations without a systematic approach quickly becomes
cumbersome and error-prone.
In the last years Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) [ABDN`17] emerged as the main infrastructure
design approach. A IaC framework uses a specification language to model the desired infrastruc-
ture. A provisioning tool, called orchestrator, takes as input the specification and automatically
deploys the infrastructure on an IaaS provider. We propose the following example to clarify the
structure of a generic IaC specification language.
Figure 3.4 provides a class diagram representation of the infrastructure appearing in the working
example. The box at the bottom, labeled with Primitive, contains (some of) the primitive classes
defined by a generic IaC provider. These classes abstractly define the building blocks of the
infrastructure, e.g., machines and networks.
The Network class allows for the creation of virtual networks. Each virtual network is a col-
lection of virtual subnetworks, i.e., the Subnetwork class. A virtual subnetwork is labeled with
two properties, i.e., address and netmask, that specify the network address and netmask of the
subnetwork.
The Compute class represents a generic host, e.g., a virtual machine. An instance of Compute
must declare its image, i.e., the installed OS, flavor, i.e., the hardware profile, and init_script, i.e.,
the instructions to correctly configure the host. There can also be dependencies between Compute
objects. For instance, the www server depends on the db server. Typically, the orchestrator is
responsible for resolving the existing dependencies, e.g., by creating the Compute objects in the
right order.
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Figure 3.4: A generic IaC specification for the working example theater.
Finally, Compute objects can be connected to one or more subnetworks. This behavior is mod-
eled by the Port class that defines a generic network port for connecting to a subnetwork. Each
port can also carry a (fixed) IP address specified in the address and netmask properties. In the
diagram, the db_Server_port and www_DMZ_port are instances of the Port class and connect
the db and www server to the two subnetworks with addresses 192.168.2.100 and 198.51.100.5,
respectively.
3.2.3 Datalog
Datalog [CGT90] is a declarative logic programming language which enjoys efficient algorithms
for query resolution. A Datalog specification consists of a list of facts and clauses. A fact
Ppa1, . . . , anq states that a predicate P is satisfied by the elements of a tuple pa1, . . . , anq. A
clause T:-T1, ..., Tn states that a term T can be inferred from the terms T1, ..., Tn, called the
premises of the clause. Terms are also predicates, but, unlike facts, they can contain variables,
e.g., A, B, X, . . .
A Datalog query T? is evaluated by an engine, i.e., a solver, against a specification to decide
whether T is entailed by the given facts and clauses in the specification. When this is the case,
the Datalog engine returns the list of facts and clauses, namely the proof trace, that have been








3: Q(a, c) :- P(a, b), P(b, c).
Q(X = a, c)
Figure 3.5: A Datalog specification with a query (left) and a proof trace (right).
To exemplify, consider the Datalog specification on the left of Figure 3.5. The specification
consists of two facts and one clause. Moreover, we append a query at the end of the specification.
The query is valid if an assignment to X can be found that satisfies Q(X,c). This is trivially
true for the query and a possible proof trace is given on the right of Figure 3.5. The proof ends
by finding an assignment, i.e., X = a, that satisfies the query. To obtain this result, the engine
applied the (only) clause in the specification (line 3) by instantiating its variables. The right-hand
side of the clause contains the premises that are available in the initial part of the trace (lines 1
and 2).
The decision problem for a Datalog query is P-complete in the size of the Datalog specifica-
tion [DEGV01].1 This ensures that the verification process scales well even with large specifica-
tions.
3.3 Scenario Definition Language
The design phase aims at generating a suitable blueprint of the scenario, covering all the relevant
aspects from the infrastructure description to the objectives of the cyber exercise. Although the
infrastructure has an important role, there are other aspects to consider when designing a sce-
nario. In general, IaC is not meant to model these components and must be extended to support
them. Our Scenario Definition Language (SDL) builds on TOSCA [OAS19], a prominent IaC
language, but it introduces several new elements that we describe in this section. Briefly, we
carry out three extensions, i.e., piq we define new, scenario-specific node and relationship types,
piiq we introduce two special properties to support the verification and testing process and piiiq
we implement a novel query language based on access patterns.
3.3.1 TOSCA integration
The Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Applications (TOSCA) [OAS19] is a
YAML-based [BKEI08] OASIS standard language for designing the topology and the life-cycle
of a cloud application. A TOSCA-enabled IaaS provider must have a suitable TOSCA orches-
1The study of the Datalog fragments that admit efficient solvers is an active research field, e.g., see [GGV02].
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trator.2 TOSCA implements the concepts of Figure 3.4 by means of a rich type system. This will
be further discussed in Section 3.4.2. Briefly, the main constituents of TOSCA are the following.
Node types. They define an infrastructure component, e.g., a server or a network, or a compo-
nent element, e.g., a software installed on a server. A node type can include properties, attributes,
capabilities and requirements. Properties represent some static, node-specific feature, e.g., the
hostname. Attributes resemble properties, but they are used to store a value that is set by the or-
chestrator after the instantiation, e.g., think of a dynamically assigned IP address. Requirements
and capabilities define what the node needs and (optionally) provides to the others. Requirements
and capabilities mainly serve as the joints for the relationships (see below).
Relationship and capability types. They are used to connect nodes and, as it happens for node
types, can include properties and attributes, e.g., the credentials for the authenticated service
exposed by the node we are connecting. A relationship has a direction, and it connects the re-
quirement of a source node to the capability of a target node. Moreover, each requirement can put
a constraint on the types of both the target node and capability. For instance,3 a WordPress web
application requires to connect to piq a database piiq endpoint, i.e., a network database. To model
this, the WordPress node includes a requirement database_endpoint. The database_endpoint
requirement constrains the type of the target node to be Database and the type of the target
capability to be Endpoint. These two constraints capture piq and piiq, respectively.
Interfaces. Nodes and relationships may have interfaces. An interface defines a custom operation
to be invoked by the orchestrator. Two kinds of interfaces exist, i.e., standard and on demand.
A standard interface defines a task related to the life-cycle phases of a node (e.g., create, start,
and stop). For instance, one can add a standard, create interface to a compute node to ask the
orchestrator for installing a certain software package when the node is created. Instead, on-
demand interfaces introduce new tasks. The orchestrator permits to invoke the tasks through the
definition of a new workflow. For instance, the on-demand interface can be used to implement
an application-specific logic (see [RBL19, § 7.3.2]).
A node template is a specification of a cloud application obtained through the composition of
the elements mentioned above. In particular, each element is obtained by instantiating its base,
namely normative, type. Roughly speaking, the TOSCA normative types provide a set of prim-
itive classes (see Figure 3.4). Designers can define their own types by extending the normative
types. As discussed in [BS14], the type inheritance enables some well-know mechanisms, e.g.,
type substitution and reuse, that simplify the design process.
Example 1. Consider the diagram depicted in Figure 3.6. It is an excerpt of the specification
for the working example introduced in Section 3.1. In particular, it specifies the infrastructure
2Existing TOSCA-enabled orchestrators often accept a slightly extended version of the TOSCA standard, i.e., a
TOSCA dialect. If not differently stated, the examples in this work refer to the ARIA TOSCA dialect [ARI19].
3See [OAS19] for more details.
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Figure 3.6: An excerpt from the (TOSCA-style) diagram for the working example.
of the web server (www) and the hosting network (DMZ). The www server runs on a virtual
machine, an instance of the Compute node type. The hardware configuration of www and its
operating system image are set by using the flavor and image properties, respectively. The DMZ
network is an instance of the Network node type. A DMZ subnetwork, instance of Subnetwork
node type, is in relationship, DependsOn, with the DMZ network and allows to specify its block
of IP addresses in the cidr property. Moreover, the DMZ subnetwork provides the Bindable ca-
pability for supplying connections to the DMZ network. The www connectivity is represented by
www_DMZ_port, an instance of the Port node type which also includes the fixed_ip property for
assigning a fixed address to the connected node. The node www_DMZ_port is the source of two
relationships, namely BindsTo and LinksTo. The former connects the Bindable requirement to
the Bindable capability of the Compute node www. The latter connects the Linkable requirement
to the Bindable capability of the DMZ_subnet Subnetwork node.
Node instances are collections containing piq the entity type, piiq a key-value dictionary of prop-
erties, and piiiq a list of requirement bindings. A relationship between two nodes exists when a
requirement of a source node instance is bound to the name of the target.
Example 2. Consider the YAML specification given in Figure 3.7. It is the TOSCA encoding of
the diagram of Figure 3.6. Node www (line 1) represents the compute entity for the web server.
It is an instance of the aria.openstack.nodes.Server type (line 2), i.e., a subtype of
tosca.nodes.Compute denoting a virtual machine that runs on an OpenStack IaaS. 4 This
node contains two properties: the name of the base operating system image (line 4) and the flavor
(line 5) of the virtual machine. A port requirement (line 7) permits to establish a relationship
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23 - network: DMZ
Figure 3.7: An excerpt of the TOSCA specification for the working example.
with the Port node www_DMZ_port (line 8). The port assigns a fixed IP address to the virtual
machine using the property fixed_ip (line 11). Also, the port is related to the DMZ Network
node (line 13) and DMZ_subnet Subnet node (line 14). The IP addressing configuration of
DMZ_subnet is specified in the subnet property (line 20).
3.3.2 SDL types
SDL introduces a number of new node types. Their primary purpose is to model the scenario
specific aspects and to integrate them in a TOSCA blueprint. Below we introduce the most
relevant ones.
System types The type System represents the base class of a generic system of the scenario
(e.g., workstations, servers, smartphones). Each System node is associated (through a relation-
ship) with an existing TOSCA Compute node. The Compute node is the virtual machine
where the System runs.
Subtypes of System are used to model more specific elements. For instance, Firewall rep-
resents a System node with firewall functionalities. In particular, it is characterized by a default
policy, e.g., allows all the traffic passing through its network interfaces (default: allow). It has the
capability Rule that enables a relationship with the Policy nodes. Briefly, a Policy node
defines a firewall rule through the specification of a traffic pattern. The pattern is represented
by the properties source, destination, protocol, and port. The meaning is that the
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associated firewall has to block the connections matching the pattern.5
A System node can can also be related to some Artifact, Software, and User. An
Artifact node denotes a file or some other piece of data, e.g., a cryptographic key. A
Software node represents a program installed on a System. It may provide a service end-
point (specifying a port and a protocol) if it is network accessible. Also, a relationship with a
User defines the running privileges of the software. Finally, a User node models a user of the
System through a requirement Host. Its properties include its username, password, and
role (denoting its privileges in the System).
All the types introduced above include a capability denoting the fact that they can be involved in
some vulnerability (see below). For instance, a software can suffer from a known security flaw,
while a user can have a weak password.
Scenario-specific types The Vulnerability type is perhaps the most interesting element
in our context. As a matter of fact, it represents a generic, security vulnerability involved in the
scenario. Precisely characterize the notion of vulnerability is not trivial and many definitions
exist (e.g., see [NIS20]).
In our context, a vulnerability is any security weakness introduced by some (mis) configuration.
As discussed above, vulnerabilities may refer to any system type in the scenario. Moreover, they
must specify the configuration procedure, i.e., the steps injecting the vulnerability in the sce-
nario, and the exploit operations, i.e., how the attacker uses the vulnerability. Its properties and
relationships with the scenario elements vary with the specific vulnerability. Since vulnerabilities
are extremely heterogeneous, we do not put further constraints on their structure.
A Principal represents a subject operating in the scenario. For instance, attackers (red team)
and defenders (blue team) are principals. Typically, a Principal has a relationship with some
User nodes representing the accounts initially controlled. The objective of a Principal is to
achieve its Goals. This is specified through a relationship between the two nodes. A Goal rep-
resents a state of the scenario that identifies the winning conditions of the related Principal,
e.g., gain access to a certain system. A detailed discussion on the role of Goal nodes is given in
Section 3.4.2.
Relationship types SDL also introduces new relationship types. The primitive relationship
types of TOSCA model the infrastructural dependencies only. For instance, we use HostedOn
to connect a SDL System to the TOSCA Compute node hosting it. Scenario-specific de-
pendencies, e.g., the one occurring between a vulnerability and its attack vector, fall outside
the scope of TOSCA. In general, one might use the generic DependsOn relationship. Yet,
5Actual firewall policy languages can be more complex and the definition of rigorous languages is still an open
research issue, e.g., see [BDF`18].
34
Figure 3.8: A SDL fragment from the specification for the working example.
this would require to customize each instance of the relationship with its specific deployment
logic (see Section 3.4.3). An alternative to DependsOn is to define new relationship types that
commonly occur in the scenarios. For instance, a relationship GetsUsername can connect
a Vulnerability node to a User node. The meaning is that the Vulnerability node
reads the username property of the User node and uses it for the configuration of the vulnera-
bility. To exemplify, think of a user enumeration vulnerability where an attacker enumerates the
users of a service by testing a dictionary of common usernames. To properly configure it, one
has to make sure that the target username belongs to the dictionary.
Example 3. The SDL diagram in Figure 3.8 extends the TOSCA specification of Example 1
by adding some elements of Scenario 1 (see Section 3.1). In particular, here we only consider
the third, EoP vulnerability of Scenario 1 (see Section 3.1) and we assume that the red team
already knows the credentials to remotely access as an unprivileged user. The www_system
node represents the Linux system running on the Compute node www. The User.Linux node
www_user is hosted on the Linux system. The properties of www_user define its username,
password, and role (where user stands for a standard, unprivileged user). Similarly, www_root
models the administrator of www_system. Like www_user, www_root has a username and a


































































Figure 3.9: An excerpt of SDL node types declaration.
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default configuration of the Ubuntu Linux distribution [Can19] (represented by the www node in
Example 1).
The www_vuln_eop node represents the EoP vulnerability mentioned above. Its type is
Vulnerability.Linux.EoP and it has two requirements, i.e., fromUser and toUser.
Respectively, they connect to the unprivileged and the privileged users. Such a connection occurs
through the GetsUsername relationship.
A Principal node eve represents the attacker (red team). It is related to www_user, i.e.,
the account initially controlled by the attacker. Finally, the goal node is related to eve and
it represents the objective of the attacker. It is an instance of the goal.GainPrivilege
type and it has two requirements, namely principal and privilege, meaning that the
connected Principal (namely eve) aims at acquiring the privileges of the connected User
(namely www_root). Notice that this is not the final goal of Scenario 1 (i.e., reading the content
of the database). In fact, it is an intermediate goal, i.e., a sub-goal enabling the final one, that we
consider here for the sake of presentation.
Example 4. In Figure 3.9 we give the type declaration of the node types related to the vul-
nerability introduced in Example 3. The User type (lines 1-20) represents a SDL primitive and
inherits from the root of all the SDL types, namely sdl.nodes.Root. It has three properties:
username (line 4), is a mandatory string identifying the user in the system, password (line
7), an optional string representing the user’s password, and role (9) representing the user’s
privileges. Two roles are modeled in the example, i.e., admin and user (line 12-13). An
unspecified value for the role property implies a default user role (line 11). Moreover, User
has the capability vulnerability (line 15) of type VulnerabilityContainer since a
vulnerability may affect it.
Principal (lines 21-32) represents another SDL primitive type. It has a mandatory name
property (line 24) for identifying the principal. A knowledge (line 28) requirement to link
the principal with her initial knowledge, e.g., the controlled account www_user in Figure 3.8.
Moreover, Principal has the capability principal (line 31) of type PrincipalProvider
discussed in Example 3.
The type User.Linux (lines 33-35), extends the User type described above. The definition
of a subtype for User is necessary to discriminate between OS-specific procedures such as user
creation and vulnerability exploitation.
The type Vulnerability.Linux.EoP (lines 36-52) extends the supertype Vulnerability.
Linux. It contains the fromUser and toUser requirements described in Example 3. They
both specify VulnerabilityProvider as capability and User.Linux as target node
type. Also, they both only admit a relationship of type GetsUsername.
The Goal.GainPrivilege type (lines 53-64) inherits from the Goal primitive type. It has a
description (line 56) property that we use to annotate each instance of the goal. For instance,
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it may describe the goal w.r.t. the current scenario, e.g., for team briefing. As anticipated in
Example 3, this type is related with a Principal and a User. These two relationships are
enabled by the requirements principal (line 59) and privilege (line 62), respectively.
3.3.3 Behavior and runtime
The scenario story line amounts to a sequence of actions that make the scenario evolve over time.
These actions play a crucial role for the verification and testing of the scenario. Thus, we need to
introduce two distinct abstractions, one for statically modeling an action and one for providing
its dynamic semantics. For this reason, all the SDL node and relationship types have two spe-
cial properties, i.e., behavior and runtime. Intuitively, behavior properties contain terms
used for the verification process (see Section 3.4.2). Instead, runtime is associated with com-
mands, for instance shell scripts, to be executed. Such commands are mostly used for the testing
phase (see Section 3.4.3). Both runtime and behavior properties are given as finite mappings
between unique identifiers and commands and terms, respectively. Moreover, we require the two
mappings to have exactly the same domain. Differently said, the runtime maps an identifier to a
command if and only if the behavior maps the same identifier to a term.
3.3.4 Access pattern language
TOSCA natively provides operations, called intrinsic functions, to access the information stored
inside a node [RBL19, § 4.3]. For instance, a node n can use get_property: [r,p] to
read the value assigned to property p by the node related to n through the requirement r. No-
tice that intrinsic functions can only walk through a single relationship. This is reasonable for
the design of an infrastructure, where each node is related to the others it depends on. How-
ever, it makes extremely hard to model complex dependencies such as those introduced by the
behavior property of vulnerabilities and goals. The motivation is that, for instance, a goal can
be related to nodes that are very far in the blueprint.
For this reason, we introduce an access pattern language to specify structured, path-based queries.
An access pattern ρ follows the syntax below.
ρ ::= π[P] | π{A}
π ::= πnod | πrel | πcap
πnod ::= this | πrel.src | πcap.node
πcap ::= this | πnod<-C | πrel.dst
πrel ::= this | πnod->R | πcap.rel
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An interpreter evaluates and replaces an access pattern ρ with a set6 of values according to the
target SDL specification. In particular, π[P] amounts to the value of property P of the SDL
elements pointed by π (therefore called a pointer).7 Similarly, π{A} reduces to the value of
the attribute A of the elements pointed by π. A pointer π can be of three kinds depending on the
class of the SDL elements it refers to, i.e., nodes (πnod), relationships (πrel) or capabilities (πcap).8
Each element can use this as a self-pointer.9 A node pointer πnod is also obtained by means
of the operator .node applied to (a pointer to) a capability contained by the node. A pointer
to a capability C is obtained by applying the operator <- to a node pointer. Moreover, from
a relationship pointer πrel one can access the destination capability by means of the operator
.dst. Conversely, a pointer to a relationship can be obtained either piq from a node pointer
πnod by means of the requirement R where the relationship originates (operator ->R) or piiq
from a capability through the operator .rel. For the sake of presentation we also introduce the
following abbreviations.
πnod=>R ” πnod->R.dst.node πnod<=C ” πnod<-C.rel.src
Example 5. Consider the following access patterns defined by node eve (see Figure 3.8).
this[name] this->knowledge[name] this=>knowledge[role]
The first pattern trivially evaluates to eve. The second one requires to access property name
of the relationship originating from the requirement knowledge, i.e., GetsCredentials.
Finally, the last access pattern follows the relationship originating from knowledge and points
to node alice whose property role is assigned to user.
3.4 Introducing CRACK
In this section, we present our framework CRACK. We start in Section 3.4.1 by providing a
general description of its structure. Then we detail the main constituents, i.e., its specification
language, the scenario verification and automatic testing process.
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Figure 3.10: CRACK general workflow.
3.4.1 Overview of the approach
Figure 4.9 depicts the abstract workflow of CRACK. The scenario development workflow starts
with the modeling task. During this task, the designer creates a blueprint of the scenario by using
SDL (see Section 3.3). The model is then type checked to detect possible inconsistencies. If
it is the case, type errors are returned to the modeling task to be fixed. Otherwise, the process
proceeds to the verification task. In the current implementation, CRACK generates a Datalog
specification from the model and feeds it to a Datalog engine (see Section 3.4.2). We stress the
fact that our approach can be extended with other verification techniques. To support this oper-
ation, CRACK is based on a modular design. If the Datalog verification fails, the unreachable
goals are returned to the design process, otherwise a proof trace for each goal is generated and
the process moves to the infrastructure initialization task. When the infrastructure is up and run-
ning, CRACK performs the test execution phase (described in Section 3.4.3). This task converts
the proof traces into unit tests and executes them on the deployed infrastructure. If a test fails,
a feedback is provided to the user in order to refine the scenario blueprint. Eventually, when all
the tests are passed, the scenario is ready to be played.
6Since SDL relationships can be many-to-many, the evaluation of an access pattern is not guaranteed to result in
a single value.
7For brevity, we may omit [P] when P = name.
8Notice that requirements cannot declare properties in TOSCA.
9We omit it when clear from the context.
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Table 3.1: Predefined Datalog predicates (excerpt).
Predicate Description
knows(A,D) Principal A knows datum D (e.g., a password)
hasAccount(A,H,U) Principal A has an account on host H as user U
hasUser(U,H,P,R) Host H has user U with password P and role R
listeningOn(H,Q,S) Host H has a software on port S with protocol Q
isConnected(H,N) Host H is connected to network N
hostACL(H,K,Q,S) Host H can access host K via protocol Q on port S
3.4.2 Scenario Verification
SDL inherits the TOSCA type system (cf. Section 3.3.1). A well-typed blueprint enjoys some
properties of interest, such as the coherence between nodes and relationships [BTS17]. Although
efficient, type checking cannot verify more complex properties. To overcome this limitation,
we introduce a further verification phase that converts a well-typed SDL model into a Datalog
specification (see Section 3.4.2). Objectives are then encoded as queries that must be satisfied by
the specification.
A successful verification yields as a set of proof traces, one for each objective. Proof traces
are later used as input to the deployment and testing phases (cf. Section 3.4.3). Interestingly, a
verification failure is also useful: invalid queries can be productively used (e.g., see [KLS12]) to
identify bugs in the model that originated the specification.
Encoding
The encoding process generates a Datalog specification from a scenario blueprint. The Datalog
terms refer to a set of predefined predicates. Some predicates are inspired by [OGA05]. The
most relevant ones are listed in Table 3.1.
Facts and clauses belong to three blocks, i.e., constants, behaviors and goals. Constants include
Datalog terms that model the standard behavior common to any infrastructure. For instance, the
clause
hasAccount(A,H,U) :- hasUser(U,H,P,R), knows(A,U), knows(A,P).
means that principal A owns account U on host H if user U exists on H and A knows both U and
the associated password P.
Behaviors blocks contains the terms introduced by the SDL elements through the behavior prop-
erty (see Section 3.3). The behavior property consists of a mapping between identifiers and
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term patterns. A term pattern resembles a standard Datalog term, i.e., a fact or a clause, but its
parameters can also be access patterns (see Section 3.3.4).
Example 6. Consider the SDL fragment of Example 3. We show the Datalog term generated
by the EoP vulnerability. Let assume that www_vuln1 has the following behavior property.
hasAccount(A, H, =>ToUser) :- hasUser(=>ToUser, H, P1, R1),
hasUser(=>FromUser, H, P2, R2),
hasAccount(A, H, =>FromUser).
The term above models the vulnerability prerequisites (clause premises) and effect. In practice,
the vulnerability allows a principal A to obtain the control over a target high-privileged user
=>ToUser10 by leveraging a misconfiguration. In particular, the misconfiguration has to do
with a low-privileged user =>FromUser that can impersonate =>ToUser when launching a
certain command. For this to happen three conditions must be satisfied.
iq The high-privileged account =>ToUser exists on the target system.
iiq A low-privileged account =>FromUser also exists on the target system.
iiiq Principal A has control over the low-privileged account.
Similarly, the behavior property of the relationship GetsCredentials is defined as follows.
knows(.src, .dst.node[password])
knows(.src, .dst.node[username])
Finally, also the nodes of type User.Linux, i.e., alice and root, define a term pattern in
their behavior property.
hasUser(this[username],=>System,this[password],this[role])
According to the specification of Example 3, all the above term patterns contribute to the follow-
ing Datalog specification.
/* Constants */
hasAccount(A,H,U) :- hasUser(U,H,P,R), knows(A,U), knows(A,P).
/* EoP vulnerability */
hasAccount(A, H, root) :- hasUser(root, H, P1, R1),





10Recall that this is an abbreviation for this=>ToUser[name].
42
/* root */
hasUser(root, www_system, , admin).
/* alice */
hasUser(alice, www_system, 9JmDGEr4, user).
Finally, the SDL goals result in queries to be evaluated against the Datalog model. Such queries
denote that a certain configuration is reachable in the scenario.
Example 7. Consider the node goal of Example 3. Its behavior property contains the term
hasAccount(=>Principal, =>Privilege=>System, =>Privilege)?which re-
duces to the query hasAccount(eve, www_system, root)?.
Notice that, in this particular example, the goal query contains no free variables. Thus, its evalu-
ation results in a plain boolean value.
Verification
The verification process boils down to running a Datalog engine against the goal queries. The
verification fails when one or more queries cannot be satisfied. In such a case, the failure denotes
that a principal cannot achieve one of its goals.
Example 8. Consider again the Datalog specification of Example 6 and the query of Example 7.
The query is trivially satisfied by the specification. The generated proof trace is as follows.
1. hasUser(root, www_system, , admin). /* Fact */
2. hasUser(alice, www_system, 9JmDGEr4, user). /* Fact */
3. knows(eve, alice). /* Fact */
4. knows(eve, 9JmDGEr4). /* Fact */
5. hasAccount(eve, www_system, alice) :-
hasUser(alice, www_system, 9JmDGEr4, user), /* From 2 */
knows(eve, alice), /* From 3 */
knows(eve, 9JmDGEr4). /* From 4 */
6. hasAccount(eve,www_system,root) :-
hasUser(root, www_system, , admin), /* From 1 */
hasUser(alice, www_system, 9JmDGEr4, user), /* From 2 */
hasAccount(eve, www_system, alice). /* From 5 */
We discuss the steps of the proof trace in backward order. The last step (6) concludes the proof by
inferring the goal query. The proof step consists of an application of the clause introduced by the
EoP vulnerability (see Example 6). To apply the clause, three preconditions must be satisfied.
Two of them amount to facts appearing in the specification (i.e., 1 and 2), thus requiring no
further proofs. Instead, the last one is inferred by applying the clause of the constants block (see
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Example 5). The inference step (5) is based on three premises, i.e., 2, 3 and 4. Since all of them
are facts appearing in the specification, the proof is completed.
3.4.3 Deployment and testing
Once verified, a blueprint can be instantiated and executed. In general, the deployment process
is not guaranteed to preserve the model-verified properties. As a matter of fact, the abstract,
high-level design purposely neglects some implementation aspects that may affect the scenario
at runtime. For instance, a piece of software may behave differently from the expectations of the
scenario designer.
To favor a prompt detection and debugging of the scenario, we leverage the verification proof
traces to automatically generate and run tests. Each test aims at confirming that a model-verified
property also holds in the deployed scenario.
Deployment
The deployment phase generates the directives for the IaaS provider. Many solutions exist
for the interpretation/translation of the TOSCA specifications into the orchestration instruc-
tions of the major IaaS provider (e.g., see Cloudify [Clo19], ARIA TOSCA [ARI19], Open-
TOSCA [BBH`13], Alien4Cloud [Ato19] and Heat-Translator [Ope19b]). All of them only
apply to the standard TOSCA. Clearly, to support our SDL we could customize one of them.
However, this would make SDL incompatible with the other existing TOSCA implementations.
To avoid the customization and preserve the compatibility with the existing TOSCA-based tech-
nologies, we rely on the TOSCA interfaces (see Section 3.3.1). In particular, for all the SDL
node types we declare a standard interface. Recall that all of the SDL types have some rela-
tionship (either direct or indirect, i.e., through a relationships path) with one TOSCA Compute
node (see Section 3.3.1). Such relationship is resolved at runtime to identify the platform where
the interface task must be executed. Thus, all the tasks defined by our standard interfaces result
in a configuration command to be executed on a certain TOSCA Compute node. To clarify we
propose the following example.
Example 9. Consider again the EoP vulnerability (node www_vuln1) of Example 3. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows the continuation of the declaration of linux.vulnerability.EoP (given
in Figure 3.9). Clearly, the vulnerability must be enabled by properly configuring www, i.e., the
Compute node where the privilege escalation takes place. In this case, the node www is iden-








Figure 3.11: Extended YAML declaration of the EoP vulnerability.
#!/bin/bash
# read username attributes
fromUser= #...
toUser= #...
echo "$fromUser ALL=($toUser) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/apt-get" >> /etc/sudoers
Figure 3.12: Implementation of eop-apt-config.sh.
The implementation of the interface is given through a shell script (line 41). We report core oper-
ations of the script in Figure 3.12. Briefly, the script enables a specific implementation of the EoP
vulnerability for Debian-based OS. The vulnerability is activated through a misconfiguration of
the /etc/sudoers file that allows underprivileged users to invoke the Debian package man-
ager apt-get in passwordless mode [The20f].In particular, the script retrieves the usernames
of the two users. Usernames are obtained by reading the corresponding SDL attributes which
contain actual, runtime values. Then, the vulnerability is enabled by appending the vulnerable
configuration line to /etc/sudoers.
Testing
The test execution process consists of translating a Datalog proof trace into an executable test
and run it on the deployed scenario. The testing process is handled by a Test Execution Engine
(TEE).
Figure 3.13 schematically depicts the TEE and its relationship with a running scenario. The
test execution proceeds in this way. The next fact F pv̄q, namely the Fact Under Test (FUT), in
the input Datalog trace is extracted and given to a trace interpreter. The interpreter retrieves a
test driver, i.e., a script specifically designed to test facts referring to the predicate F , from an
internal database. The test driver has a predefined interface and it may refer to values taken from
either the FUT, the scenario blueprint or runtime information generated by the test execution and
stored in a test database. The structure of the test database is straightforward. In particular, it
consists of a table for each Datalog predicate where each column corresponds to a parameter.
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test := get_runtime_from_blueprint(sut, fut)
insert_values_in_script(test, ū, v̄, w̄)
r := submit_script_to_iaas(sut, test)
if(is_not_successful(r)) then test_failed()
else insert_values_in_testdb(r) and test_passed()
Figure 3.14: Test driver pseudo-code.
Notice, however, that actual, runtime values may be considered when they simplify the testing
operations. For instance, one might prefer to store the actual username of a user, rather then its
SDL identifier as it appears in the Datalog trace (see Example 10).
The general structure of a test driver is given in Figure 3.14. Each driver starts by retrieving the
necessary data from the FUT (ū), the blueprint (v̄) and the test database (w̄). Then it identifies
the system under testing (SUT) by checking which SDL node declares the FUT in its behavior.
Similarly, the test driver retrieves the corresponding test script from the runtime property of the
SUT. Before running the script, the actual test values must be inserted, i.e., passed as the input
parameters of the script. Eventually, the script is submitted to the IaaS provider that executes it
on the SUT and returns the output values. The output is a tuple on which a successful condition
can be checked. If the check is not passed the test fails, otherwise the driver inserts the output
values in the test database and terminates.
Example 10. Consider again the EoP vulnerability of our working example. Its runtime property
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1. #!/bin/bash
2. # Test driver for hasAccount(principal, host, user)
3. function getParam() {
4. # parses and reads the input tuples ū, v̄, w̄
5. }
6. principal=$(getParam $1) # the principal
7. host=$(getParam $2) # the host
8. username=$(getParam $3) # user’s username
9. knowledge=$(getParam $4) # principal’s knowledge
10. r=""
11. for k in $knowledge
12. do
13. if [ "$(grep -P "^$k.+NOPASSWD.+apt.+" /etc/sudoers)" ]; then
14. r=$(su $k -c ’sudo /usr/bin/apt-get update \
15. -o APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::="id"’ | grep $username) && break
16. done
17. if [ ! "$r" ]; then
18. username=""
19. fi
20. echo "($principal, $host, $username)"
21. # is_not_successful() iff $username == ""
Figure 3.15: Runtime script used to test the EoP vulnerability.
contains the script of Figure 3.15.
The script starts by reading the inputs provided by the test driver (lines 6–9). For this purpose
a utility function is used (getParam, line 3). There are four inputs passed by the driver. Two
of them, i.e., principal and host, are taken from the FAU. Instead, username is taken
from the corresponding attribute of the node User. The reason is that the script requires the
actual username, rather than the User node identifier (which appears in the proof trace). The
last parameter is the knowledge of the principal, i.e., the content of table Knowledge (for the
current principal) in the test database. All in all, the script checks if the principal’s knowledge
contains a username that enables the exploitation, i.e., escalating the privileges. In details, the
main body of the script amounts to a for loop iterating on each element k of knowledge (line
11). Then, through a regular expression matching (line 13), the script checks if the configu-
ration file /etc/sudoers contains a line piq starting with (username) k, piiq containing the
keyword NOPASSWD, i.e., indicating the passwordless command execution mode, and piiiq con-
taining the exploitable command apt (see Example 9). If the match occurs, the script executes
the exploit (line 14) as the user k (su $k -c). The EoP exploit leverages a configuration op-
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tion (APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::) for invoking arbitrary commands before updating
the apt package index file. In particular, the script invokes the command id for printing the
username of the current user. If the output matches username, i.e., the privileged user, the for
loop breaks and r is assigned to the command output (lines 14–15). After the loop, r is left empty
only if the script failed in running the exploit. Hence, the script overwrites username with
en empty string (line 17-19). Eventually, the script returns the tuple (principal, host,
username) (line 20). The driver checks whether the script failed by comparing username
with the empty string.
A test is successful when each step succeeds. In this case, we obtain an evidence that the proof
trace has been preserved after the scenario deployment. Otherwise, we get a useful indication
of what went wrong. In particular, a test failure amounts to the failure of a certain script. By
reversing our mapping, we find which clause, appearing in the proof trace, is not satisfied by the
deployed scenario. As a consequence, the blueprint can be inspected to understand and fix the
error. When all the tests are successful the scenario is ready.
3.5 CRACK Demo
In this section, we provide a demonstration of CRACK applied to our working example. CRACK
is available as a free open source software on GitHub [Rus20a]. More precisely, the version used
for this work is CRACK v1.0.1 [Rus20b]. The repository contains piq the source code, piiq
the configurations and piiiq the library of SDL elements required for replicating the experiments
described below. In particular, the SDL implementation consists of 62 node types, 20 capabilities
and 11 relationships. All together, they amount to 4343 YAML lines of code (loc) for the type
definitions, 916 shell loc for the deployment interfaces and 476 shell loc for the runtime scripts.
CRACK is built on top of the Apache ARIA project (see Section 3.4.3). In particular, we rely
on ARIA for supporting the design (see Section 3.3) and deployment (see Section 3.4.3) phases.
Instead, the verification (see Section 3.4.2) and testing (see Section 3.4.3) phases are enabled
through a plugin extension of ARIA. Moreover, we use pyDatalog [Car16] as the Datalog engine
for the verification module.
Our testing environment runs on an Ubuntu Linux, version 16.04.5 LTS, installed on a two Intel
Xeon Processors E5440 server with 32GB of RAM. Finally, we use DevStack [Ope19a] for
installing OpenStack 3.16.0 (Rocky).
The outline of the demonstration follows. We start from the design of the first scenario of our
case study in Section 3.5.1. Then, we verify (Section 3.5.2), deploy and test (Section 3.5.3) the
scenario. In Section 3.5.4, we simulate the red team activity on the running scenario. Also, there
we evaluate the effort for migrating between the first and the second scenario of the case study.
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Scenario1 # Scenario root directory
Types # SDL types directory
...
scenario.yaml # main specification file
DMZ # DMZ specifications directory
ns.yaml # ns host specification
www.yaml # www host specification
...
Server # Server specifications directory
db.yaml # db host specification
Internet # Internet specifications directory
provider.yaml # provider router specification
client.yaml # client host specification
root-ns.yaml # root-ns host specification
...
IoT # IoT specifications directory
...
config.yaml # input variables
network.yaml # network infrastructure specification
firewall.yaml # firewall specification
Figure 3.16: The file tree for the Scenario 1.
3.5.1 Design
For Scenario 1, we carry out the design from scratch. That is, we define all the elements without
assuming any prior scenario design. The design process starts from the theater elements, e.g.,
networks and compute nodes, and incrementally proceeds to the scenario aspects, e.g., vulnera-
bilities. The entire scenario is encoded in 2385 loc organized in 29 YAML files.
The files are structured as depicted in Figure 3.16. Type specifications are placed in a dedicated
folder Types. The file scenario.yaml is the entry point for the scenario specification. This
file imports all the other YAML specifications and contains the declarations of the scenario prin-
cipals and goals. In particular, recall that in our scenarios we have only one goal for eve (a.k.a.
the red team), i.e., exfiltrating data from db. We use the label DB_confidential to denote the
target data. As a consequence, the goal amounts to knows(’eve’,’DB_confidential’).
The network infrastructure is defined in network.yaml. For each network, e.g., DMZ, a di-
rectory is used to contain the relevant specifications. Each host is defined in a separate YAML
file. A host file contains the definition of the corresponding Compute node and its configuration,
e.g., www.yaml. Finally, we introduce a utility file config.yaml. Such a file contains val-
ues assigned to common reconfigurable properties, e.g., network addresses, domain names, and
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usernames. These properties can be modified for quickly reshaping the scenario by acting on a
single file.
Figure 3.17 shows the YAML specification of www for the first scenario of the working example.
We start by defining the OpenStack Compute node running www and its connection to the DMZ
subnetwork via www_DMZ_port (lines 1 and 8, respectively). Then, we connect www_system
(line 15) to www. As stated in Section 3.3.2, www_system enables the relationships with the
SDL nodes. For instance, the ssh server www_ssh (line 25), the Apache HTTP server [Apa20]
www_http (line 31), the Apache module for running PHP [The20h] pages www_php (line
38), and WordPress [Wor20] www_cms (line 43) are software components running on www.
Also, we define three users, i.e., www_root (line 71), the www_http_user (line 79) and
www_user (line 86). Finally, we add one (mis)configuration and three vulnerabilities. Briefly,
they implement three (number 2, 3 and 4) of the vulnerabilities introduced in Section 3.1.
2. The configuration www_http_userdir (line 95) exposes the users home directories and
the vulnerability www_weak_enumerable (line 103) modifies the usernames to ensure
that they are enumerable (in the sense explained in Section 3.1).
3. The node www_vuln_weakpass (line 110) configures the weak password for www_user.
4. The node www_vuln_eop (line 119) injects the EoP vulnerability (see Example 9).
Notice that, vulnerability 1. does not appear in www.yaml as it affects db.
At the end of the design step, we submit we.yaml to ARIA. This operation includes the type
checking step (see Section 3.4.2). When the operation terminates, the scenario, called a service in
the ARIA terminology, is saved as we_service. Although the scenario is technically deployable,
we still have to verify it with CRACK.
3.5.2 Verification
CRACK provides a TOSCA workflow, called verify, that implements the verification procedure
described in Section 3.4.2. We invoke the verify workflow through the ARIA workflow execution
engine. Figure 3.18 shows the output for the first scenario of the working example. The generated
Datalog specification in saved as datalog.py using the pyDatalog format.
Since the test goal is verified (Result: TRUE), the goal1.trace file containing the Dat-
alog proof trace is generated. Also, the workflow creates datalog.json. Briefly, it contains
a mapping between the Datalog terms and the SDL type declaring them. Such a mapping binds
each FUT appearing in the proof trace with the corresponding SUT during the test execution

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.18: The execution of the verify workflow.
Nat : { "node": SDL node identifier,
"type": SDL node type,
"key" : Behavior/runtime identifier }
where Nat is a unique natural number, node is the name of a node in the blueprint, type is
the SDL type of the node and key denotes a valid entry in the behavior/runtime mapping of the
node (see Section 3.3.3).
Figure 3.19 shows an excerpt of the datalog.py file. Briefly, it amounts to the Datalog facts
and clauses generated for www. The syntax follows the pyDatalog format where facts are pre-
ceded by the ’+’ symbol and clauses use ’<=’ and ’&’ in place of ’:-’ and ’,’ (respectively, cf.
Section 3.2.3). Furthermore, notice that each Datalog predicate has an extra argument, i.e., the
first one, being a natural number. Such an argument is assigned to a unique constant in each
fact and left term of the clauses. Instead, the argument appears as an unconstrained variable
in the premises of each clause. All in all, this argument maps each step of a proof trace to a
corresponding entry in the datalog.json file (through the values Nat discussed above).
Figure 3.20 contains a fragment of the proof trace generated by the validate workflow. For the
sake of presentation, we omit the proof details and we only report the facts proved at each step by
the pyDatalog deduction system. The proof succeeds by achieving the goal, i.e., knows(21,
’eve’,’DB_confidential’), at the final step.
3.5.3 Deployment and testing
The deployment process results in the infrastructure depicted in Figure 3.21. The infrastructure
contains the components discussed in Section 3.1. It is worth noticing that the actual topology
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1. + isConnected (1 , 'www ' , ' DMZ_subnet ' )
2 . + hasUser (2 , ' www_root ' , 'www ' , ' None ' , ' admin ' )
3 . + l isteningOn (3 , 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 22 ' )
4 . hasAccount (4 ,A, 'www ' , ' www_user ' ) <= knows ( ID1 ,A, ' a l i c e ' ) &
5 . hasUser ( ID2 , ' www_user ' , 'www ' ,P ,R) &
6. l isteningOn ( ID3 , 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 22 ' ) &
7 . hostACL ( ID4 ,K, 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 22 ' ) & hasAccount ( ID5 ,A,K,V)
8 . hasAccount (5 ,A, 'www ' , ' www_root ' ) <=
9. hasUser ( ID1 , ' www_root ' , 'www ' ,P ,R) &
10. hasAccount ( ID2 ,A, 'www ' , ' www_user ' )
11. knows (6 ,A, ' a l i c e ' ) <= l isteningOn ( ID1 , 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 80 ' ) &
12. hostACL ( ID2 ,K, 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 80 ' ) & hasAccount ( ID3 ,A,K,V)
13. + hasUser (7 , ' www_user ' , 'www ' , ' 9JmDGEr4 ' , ' user ' )
14. + l isteningOn (8 , 'www ' , ' t cp ' , ' 80 ' )
15. knows (9 ,A, ' venerus ' ) <= hasUser ( ID1 , ' www_http_user ' , 'www ' ,P ,R) &
15. hasAccount ( ID2 ,A, 'www ' , ' www_http_user ' )
17. knows(10 ,A, ' venerus ' ) <= hasUser ( ID1 ,U, 'www ' ,P , ' admin ' ) &
18. hasAccount ( ID2 ,A, 'www ' ,U)
19. + hasUser (11 , ' www_http_user ' , 'www ' , ' None ' , ' user ' )
Figure 3.19: An excerpt of datalog.py.
also includes the networks that were originally only implicitly defined. For instance, outside
that connects firewall to provider.
Another TOSCA workflow of CRACK, called test, executes the test for the proof trace of Fig-
ure 3.20. The result is partially reported in Figure 3.22. The structure of the test follows
the facts of Figure 3.20, but it refers to actual runtime values. For instance, the username
and password of www_user are dynamically configured by www_weak_enumerable and
www_weak_password to manager and qwerty (respectively). Finally, notice that the test
fails. When this happens, CRACK displays the execution log of the failed script for supporting
the scenario debugging process.
We now interpret and fix the error that caused the failure of Figure 3.22. From the FUT identifier,
i.e., 4, we find in datalog.json that the clause was declared by the node www_weak_password.
The corresponding runtime consists of a script running a dictionary-based brute force over
ssh by using Hydra [HK18]. From the log, we discover that the error occurred because the
password-based authentication is not enabled on ssh. The reason is that, by default, ssh is con-
figured only to support key-based authentication. To solve this issue, one can add the property
PasswordAuthentication: "yes" to the node www_ssh (see Figure 3.17). Once the




/* proof of knows(6,'eve','alice') */
New fact: knows(6,'eve','alice')








Figure 3.20: An excerpt of goal1.trace.
3.5.4 Execution
We now describe the scenario execution by simulating the attack of the red team. The steps of
the attack are depicted in Figure 3.23. Initially, the red team scans the machine hosting the home
page of ACME Corp (a). Running nmap shows that the server is open on ports 80 and 22. Then,
they run the nmap script http-userdir-enum [Lyo19] and enumerate two users, i.e., backup and
manager (b). The next step (c) is brute forcing the password of manager using hydra and the
rockyou [MH18] wordlist (see Section 3.5.3). Once the red team has the password, they can log
in www as manager (d) and execute the privilege escalation discussed in Example 9 (e).
Finally, they leverage the root privileges to read the Wordpress configuration file wp-config.php
and obtain the administrator access credentials to the database (f). In this way, the red team can
browse all the existing records (g) and exfiltrate the data.
3.5.5 Evaluation
Below we answer the research questions of Section 1.2.2.
Answer to RQ1 Our SDL is a steppingstone for the scenario development process. Being a
TOSCA extension, CRACK SDL complies with the existing OASIS standard. Thus, IaC devel-
opers take advantage of their expertise when designing a scenario and only limited extra skills
are required, e.g., for the security-specific aspects. We introduce a design paradigm that can be
called Scenario as Code (SaC) that extends the IaC paradigm with concepts that are specific to












































Execution of test 'hasUser' on www




Execution of test 'knows' on www




Execution of test 'hasAccount' on www
with parameters 'eve' 'www' 'manager'
Result: FAILED
Log:
Hydra v8.1 (c) 2014 by van Hauser/THC
[...]
[DATA] attacking service ssh on port 22
[ERROR] target ssh://127.0.0.1/ does not support password authentication.
[...]
Figure 3.22: An excerpt of goal1-test.log containing a failed test step.
Answer to RQ2 CRACK provides an integrated framework for modeling, verifying, deploying
and testing a scenario. On the one hand, our SDL relies on TOSCA for modeling and deploying
any infrastructure of interest. On the other hand, SDL extends TOSCA to also model exercise-
specific aspects, e.g., vulnerabilities, and verify their interplay. However, since we assume no
formal relationship to hold between a model and what is actually deployed, verification is not
enough to ensure the desired properties at runtime. Therefore, to effectively support the devel-
opment, a testing phase is also needed. For this reason, CRACK tests the deployed scenario
against the traces generated by the verification process. Although we implemented this approach
for Datalog, we stress that other verification techniques are also compatible. Since SDL is ex-
tensible, its elements can be labeled with other specification languages. These labels can be
composed according to the blueprint topology in order to build global specifications to be veri-
fied. As far as the considered verification technique generates evidence, e.g., proof traces, that
admit instantiation to an actual test, they contribute to the CRACK development process.
Answer to RQ3 To answer this question, we start by considering some statistics about our
case study. In Table 3.2, for all the scenarios we report piq the size (i.e., the total number of loc
including YAML code and scripts) and the number of types of the scenario blueprint, piiq the size
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(a) Connecting to client (via remote desktop) and scanning www.
(b) Enumerating the users. (c) Brute forcing the password.
(d) Accessing www via ssh. (e) Executing the privilege escalation.
(f) Reading the Wordpress configuration. (g) Accessing the database content.
Figure 3.23: Scenario execution from the perspective of the red team.
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Table 3.2: Numbers of the four scenarios.
BLUEPRINT SPECIFICATION TEST EXECUTION
# size types size time FUTs time
1 4537 32 275 4.94 205 288.65
2 3764 28 271 4.26 168 224.93
3 4196 28 271 4.12 168 258.67
4 4397 30 270 4.18 215 283.25
Table 3.3: Reuse rate of Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 (w.r.t. Scenario 1).
SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO 4
loc 3340 (88.73%) 3895 (92.83%) 3924 (89.24%)
types 25 (89.29%) 26 (92.86%) 27 (90.00%)
(Datalog loc) and time11 (seconds) for the Datalog specification verification, and piiiq the size
(number of FUT) and time (seconds) for the test execution. Instead, in Table 3.3 we highlight the
reuse rates, both in terms of loc and types, for obtaining Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 from Scenario 1.
The numbers of Table 3.3 highlight that the blueprint of Scenario 1 was largely reused. Intu-
itively, this happens since a significant portion of all the scenarios deal with a single, shared
theater. The same applies to some scenario elements, e.g., the target of the data exfiltration. We
claim that, in general, shared elements are frequent, e.g., for scenarios played in a single, specific
infrastructure such as ACME Corp. Under these assumptions, by leveraging the type system and
the expressive power of our SDL, a designer can reuse the existing blueprints. When reusing
existing elements in a different context, our verification and testing procedures ensure that the
objectives of the exercise are not compromised.
11Specification and test times include both the generation and the execution of the verification/test engine.
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Chapter 4
Cyber Ranges on the Field
In the previous chapter, we have emphasized the relevance of scenarios in a Cyber Range. In
particular, Next Generation Cyber Ranges can offer facilities for assisting and simplifying the
generation of complex scenarios making them ever closer to reality and easily modifiable. The
above properties represent the ideal conditions for creating sandboxes, i.e., testbeds, where com-
ponents (e.g., part of real infrastructures, devices, or configurations) can be tested against se-
curity threats. Testbeds are mandatory when the components under evaluation are part of real
operational critical systems.
An emerging paradigm that typically interacts with critical infrastructure components is Fog
Computing. Testing in-depth the possible security weaknesses of a Fog device means to create a
testbed that faithfully reproduces the typical operating conditions, including critical components.
In this chapter, we leverage the capabilities of Cyber Ranges and hosted scenarios to analyze
the security threats of a Fog-based solution. In Section 4.2, we extend the case study with
components required for creating a testbed which emulates a smart agriculture system, one of
the vertical markets to which Fog computing is expected to be fruitfully applicable [Bye17].
This extension allows us to examine the security model of a mainstream Fog operating systems
and point out some weaknesses as detailed in Section 4.3. Then, in Section 4.4, we proposed
a technique to reduce the identified attack surface. The same testbed allows us to perform an
experimental evaluation and verify the effectiveness of our solution (see Section 4.4.3).
4.1 Practical Fog Computing
In this section, we provide some background on Fog Computing (Section 4.1.1), Fog applications
(Section 4.1.2), and Fog operating systems (Section 4.1.3) with a specific focus on Cisco IOx.
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Figure 4.1: The Fog Computing paradigm.
4.1.1 Fog Computing
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm [SPB19] is changing the way data are produced
and analyzed, and the way application are designed, implemented and deployed. It is transform-
ing centralized, monolithic server applications managing complex IT/OT environments into a set
of smaller, device-specific, interacting applications. Each IoT application runs on its own hard-
ware and operating system, manages its own dataset and continuously interact with the other
apps.
Unfortunately, the adoption of the Cloud Computing paradigm in this setting is sub-optimal as it
requires moving data produced by IoT applications from the edge to remote data centers (i.e., in
the Cloud) and vice versa, in order to be analyzed and take decisions. This approach introduces
delays that affect interactions between IoT applications and may lead to the failure of jobs with
specific time constraints (e.g., soft real-time).
Fog Computing overcomes this problem by introducing an intermediate computing level (see
Figure 4.1) provided by specific devices, i.e., Fog nodes, that provide computational power to
analyze data just where they have been produced. In this way, delays are greatly reduced while
the advantages of decentralized computation are retained.
Fog Computing addresses the need of advanced IoT ecosystems where applications can produce
large streams of data that must be analyzed quickly. More specifically, each Fog node deals with
a subset of an IoT ecosystem, namely a set of IoT devices belonging to the same local network,
and context-aware applications working on data produced by the subset of IoT devices.
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From a technical standpoint, Fog Computing is decentralized, heterogeneous, and often domain-
specific, thereby resulting very different from the centralized approach of Cloud Computing. In
a nutshell, each Fog node has a multi-programmed OS that allows executing several applications
concurrently. A de-facto standard Fog OS at the time of writing is Cisco IOx [Cis19a].
In the following, we detail Fog applications (see Section 4.1.2) and Cisco IOx (see (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.2 Fog Applications
Fog nodes allow for executing applications in different environments which also depend on the
manufacturer and the characteristics of the hosting devices. As described in [RVM19], Fog
devices typically support the execution of at least the following packaged applications:
• Virtual Machine (VM) packaged applications, that consist of a traditional virtual machine
containing an operating system, libraries and application code. Fog devices can host a
hypervisor to run such packaged applications.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) style applications, which are self-contained programs devel-
oped using high-level languages, e.g., Java, Python, and Ruby. Fog devices provide them
with the execution environment as a service.
• Container applications, that depend and are designed to execute directly on the operating
system of the Fog node. This solution, as opposed to PaaS style, depends on the features
of the Fog operating system, but it leaves the complete flexibility to developers on the
choice of the programming language, as well as the full framework stack. Fog devices
often leverage the Linux Container (LXC) paradigm [Ber14].
Each application, regardless of the packaging method, also embeds a standard descriptor file
containing the hardware requirements that the application needs from the Fog node, in order to
execute properly (e.g., computing and network resources).
Beyond some specific features related to the execution environment, a Fog application is made
of a set of standard components. Figure 4.2 depicts such components as well as their interaction
with the Fog environment.
In particular, one main component, namely the Field Device Connector, interacts with edge
devices and acquire raw data. Moreover, further data can be retrieved directly from the Fog
platform itself, e.g., from services like GPS or other connected serial devices, using a Runtime
Support component.
A Data Processing component is in charge to elaborate the above inputs in order to apply con-
figurable rules of filtering, reduction, and analysis. The output is then processed by a Data
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Figure 4.2: Common components of a Fog application.
Transformation component which applies some custom business logic to render acquired data
using a standard representation format, like, e.g., JSON or XML. This transformation allows a
Cloud Connector to send the processed data to a centralized application, hosted in the Cloud or
in an external data-center, using a web-friendly protocol, like HTTP. At the same time, the Cloud
Connector provides a web interface, e.g., a RESTful web service, which allows the Cloud or an
external data-center to interact with the Fog application itself.
Notice that the modular approach of Fog applications follows the microservices approach [NSS14],
which is likewise adopted in the IoT environment [JKAC18].
4.1.3 Cisco IOx
Cisco IOx [Cis19a] combines the traditional Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) soft-
ware [Cis19c] with the Linux Operating System in a single network device, e.g., routers or
switches. The main objective of such a solution is enabling the hosting of applications on de-
vices running at the network edge.
Figure 4.3 depicts the components of a device running Cisco IOx [Cis18]. The Cisco IOS com-
ponent provides functionalities for network services, e.g., connectivity with the physical network
and routing protocols, and core security services, e.g., Network Address Translation (NAT) and a
firewall. The main task of the Linux component is managing the resources, e.g., computing and
storage, and providing a framework for executing Fog applications. To this aim, a specific layer,
namely Application Management, covers all life cycle aspects of applications including develop-
ment, distribution, deployment, hosting, monitoring, and management. Moreover, a middleware,
namely Cisco Application Framework (CAF), exposes an interface for accessing the function-
alities of the above layer. A command-line client (ioxclient) and a local web interface (Local
Manager) use the CAF to allow authenticated users to manage the IOx device.
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Figure 4.3: Cisco IOx architecture (as given in Cisco IOx Data Sheet [Cis18]).
Finally, an IOx node supports the execution of custom Fog applications and internal services,
namely IOx services [Cis19a], in a PaaS-style or LXC-style deployment. IOx services extend the
Cisco IOx operating system and create the basic infrastructure for a microservices ecosystem.
In particular, these services provide an implementation of the common components of a Fog
application (see Figure 4.2) and enable their interaction through a specific module named North
Bound Interface (NBI).
4.1.4 Cisco NBI
The Fog model relies on applications and services, running in different containers, interacting
with one another and with the field devices. For this reason, each Fog implementation usually
needs to execute a Message Broker, i.e., a shared and authenticated communication channel for
enabling such interaction among the involved entities.
Cisco IOx implements the Message Broker through the NBI gateway provided by the IOx ser-
vices. In detail, the NBI service allows publish and subscribe semantics, thereby using Message
Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [PPR`19].
MQTT is a lightweight messaging protocol that adopts the publish-subscribe pattern: messages
sent by publishing clients to volatile messaging queues—called topics—are received and (possi-
bly) routed by a broker to topics-subscribed clients. Topics, specified as UTF8-type strings, are
hierarchically organized into levels (using the forward slash) and are used by the broker to filter
and organize incoming messages.
Therefore, the NBI allows clients to execute four actions: create a topic, delete a topic, publish a
message, and subscribe to a topic. To publish messages, Cisco uses JSON [Bra17] as the default
notation. Accordingly, each component interacting with the NBI provides a data model [Cis19a]
for describing the content format of its own JSON messages. However, notice that data mod-
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els represent only an agreement, and each application or service is responsible for publishing
messages according to their own model.
We refer the reader to Section 4.2.2 for an example of data models and exchanged messages.
4.2 Motivating Scenario
In this section, we introduce a motivating scenario concerning the field of smart agriculture.
Therefore, we provide an implementation based on the Fog paradigm.
4.2.1 A smart agriculture system
Our motivating example, inspired by [KST`18], is a lifelike scenario in which sensors, data
acquisition and analytics contribute to the implementation of a smart agriculture system.
In this scenario, end devices belong to two categories. Sensors measure the moisture status of the
soil, while the irrigation system is used for the watering of the soil. A smart agent, implemented
by a software application, acquires data from the sensors and, if the soil moisture level falls
below a certain threshold, it activates the irrigation system. The smart agent also interacts with
remote data sources providing the weather forecasts. This allows the agent to plan the duration of
watering and optimize water consumption. Finally, the smart agent delivers data, e.g., the number
of irrigation actions per day or the average water consumption, to a remote cloud application that
provides the data visualization service.
4.2.2 Fog implementation
The functionality provided by a standard Fog deployment fits the requirements of our motivating
scenario: in fact, the smart agriculture system needs to gather and analyze few bunches of data
from local and isolated sensors (i.e., moisture) seamlessly, and requires limited computational
resources to make a decision.
To this aim, we extended the case study introduced in Section 3.1 with the components required
for deploying the smart agent as a Fog application. The resulting infrastructure is depicted in
Figure 4.4.
A physical Fog device is connected to the Server network. It provides a new virtual network,
namely App, used by the running Fog core services and applications. The IoT network hosts
the end devices used in the smart system, i.e., a moisture sensor and an irrigator. A weather
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Figure 4.4: Fog implementation of the smart irrigation infrastructure.
forecast and a data visualization services, i.e., remote services, are reachable through the Internet
connection. Below we detail each new component.
Fog device. This device represents the core element of our implementation. It provides the
connectivity at the network edge and the capabilities for running Fog applications. We employed
a Cisco IR829GW-LTE-GA-EK9 [Cis19b] running IOx software release 15.9(3)M, which is an
industrial router having connectivity for different technologies, e.g., Ethernet, serial, and wire-
less, together with the computing capabilities for running PaaS, e.g. Python, and Java, and
container-based, e.g., Docker, and LXC applications. These capabilities are provided through a
Linux-based and embedded IOx [Cis19a] operating system version 1.9.0.5.
This device can reach remote services through the Internet connectivity provided by the corporate
firewall. It interacts at the same time with the end devices using the Modbus communications
over TCP (Modbus TCP) [S`99] protocol. Moreover, it achieves segmentation between the
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connected zones using the following firewall rules configured on the IOS component.
1. Only the Remote Data Sender/Receive application can contact the public Internet.
2. Only the Modbus TCP application can contact the IoT network.
3. App network is isolated, i.e., the running applications cannot be contacted from the other
connected networks
End devices. The soil sensor measures the moisture level, and the irrigator executes the water-
ing. We simulate these devices as two slaves Modbus Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC).
In particular, the sensor has one read-only register containing the simulated moisture level, while
the irrigator has two writable registers for activating watering and setting the duration, respec-
tively.
Modbus TCP and Cloud connector. They represent two applications designed as a general
microservice for establishing Modbus TCP and executing remote Application Program Interface
(API) calls through the HTTP protocol, respectively. Each service supports the configuration of
multiple data sources, e.g., a Modbus device or a remote HTTP endpoint. For each data source,
the service requires its address, e.g., an IP address or an HTTP Uniform Resource Locator (URL),
and the data model.
1. {"dataSchemaId":"MoistureSchema",
2. "description":"Data Schema for sensor emitting moisture values",
3. "fields":[{"name":"moisture",
4. "type":"short"}]}
Figure 4.5: Data schema of a moisture sensor.
For instance, Figure 4.5 represents the data model, namely MoistureSchema, for a generic
moisture sensor. In particular, it emits the moisture values using a field named moisture (line
3) containing a short integer (line 4).
Moreover, Figure 4.6 represents the data model of a Modbus (line 2) PLC device, named
Moisture_PLC (line 1), with the capability of measuring the soil moisture. It contains a single
sensor (lines 3-13), named MoistureSensor (line 4), using the data model presented in Fig-
ure 4.5. In particular, the moisture value (line 9) is emitted reading the analog register addressed















Figure 4.6: Data schema of a PLC containing a moisture sensor.








7. "message": [{ "values": [10]}]}
Figure 4.7: A NBI message related to the soil sensor.
As an example of interaction with the NBI service, Figure 4.7 represents a JSON message pub-
lished in the Moisture topic (line 1) by the Modbus TCP application. It is related to the mois-
ture level read from the PLC measuring the soil moisture, named PLC1 (line 3). In particular, the
value is read from the MoistureSensor (see Figure 4.6) of the PLC (line 4) and it is formatted
(line 5) according to the MoistureSchema (see Figure 4.5). The timestamp (line 6) identifies
the moment in which the read event occurred and the message field contains the level value (line
7) expressed as a short integer.
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Remote services. They serve as external platforms used for visualizing data and acquiring
weather forecasts. We simulate the data visualizer using the ThingSpeak1 public Cloud service,
which enables the storing and visualization of data using remote HTTP API calls.
Figure 4.8: Data visualization for the moisture value and the irrigator status.
Figure 4.8 represents the data visualization2 for the moisture value and for the status of the
irrigator. Notice that every time the Irrigation App acquires a low value of the simulated moisture,
it activates the irrigation.
Irrigation App. It implements the functionalities described in Section 4.2.1 for the smart
agent. This application relies on the following topics created on the NBI.
• Moisture. The Modbus TCP reads moisture values from the sensor and write a correspond-
ing message on this topic.
• Irrigator. The Modbus TCP uses this topic to send data to the irrigator.
• Wxf. The Remote data sender/receiver reads weather forecasts and publishes a correspond-
ing message on this topic.
• Visualizer. The Remote data sender/receiver consumes this topic for sending data to the
ThingSpeak service.
1https://thingspeak.com
2In Figure 4.8 we give no time scale since we used a simulated time in our experiments.
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Briefly, it executes this endless loop: iq read messages from the moisture topic and extract its
level, iiq if the level is low, then read weather forecasts from WxF topic for calculating duration,
and publish to the irrigator topic the command for starting watering, iiiq write a message to the
visualizer topic containing aggregate data about the moisture level and irrigation time.
4.3 Security Model
Fog applications enable the possibility to implement the business logic to monitor and control
the on-field devices, and to interact with cloud appliances.
In our motivating scenario, the core logic of the smart irrigation infrastructure resides in the Irri-
gation App, which can monitor the IoT sensors, read the acquired data and instruct the actuators
(i.e., the irrigation system) accordingly. Furthermore, the Remote Data Sender application is in
charge to communicate with the remote cloud services and deliver data concerning the weather
forecast to the Irrigation App.
Indeed, from a security standpoint, the behavior of the Fog applications and in particular their
interaction with i) the core services, ii) the field devices, and iii) other applications (either remote
or local) represent a critical attack vector for the whole infrastructure. Furthermore, Fog applica-
tions are usually provided in a black box fashion by third party suppliers or adapted from legacy
software, and their installation process is straightforward, thereby resulting in a powerful attack
vector.
4.3.1 NBI Security Features
The IOx Core Packages provides NBI module as the main conduit for enabling secure communi-
cation between applications and services. In details, NBI is a security mechanism responsible for
iq authenticating applications, and iiq authorizing message delivery and receipt. From a general
point of view, NBI allows the enforcement of a global security policy over the communications
among Fog applications and services, as stated in [Cis19a].
Applications and services can interact with NBI through REST and websockets [MF11] APIs
that are authenticated using the OAuth protocol following the OAuth 2.0 specifications [Har12].
The connections to both the REST and websocket endpoints are secured by enabling TLS to
secure the transport. At installation time, for each application declaring the dependency in its
package.yaml, NBI assigns i) individual OAuth credentials, and ii) NBI IP address and port.
An OAuth access token is required to make successful calls to NBI. Applications use their cre-
dential to obtain a Bearer Access Token and use it to send publish/subscribe requests to NBI IP
address and port. NBI accepts incoming requests only after validating the access token.
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4.3.2 Weaknesses of NBI
Since NBI acts as the main gateway for the intercommunication between applications and ser-
vices of the Fog node, we focused our investigation on the security mechanisms enforced by
NBI.
Our analysis confirms that any Fog application can access NBI only by providing a valid OAuth
access token. As stated in [Cis19a], IOx only supports Bearer access tokens, but the lifetime of
the access token is indefinite.
As described in [YM13], Bearer tokens are considered less secure than Message Authentication
Code (MAC) tokens [J. 12] as anyone with the token can have access to the protected resources,
without being further authenticated. To protect against token spoofing and stealing, the specifi-
cation requires that the TLS mechanism must be adopted when transmitting the access token and
the protected resource requests [JH12].
Unfortunately, although the connections to both the REST and websocket endpoints support
TLS, even in the most recent IOx version, the supported certificates are self-signed, thus expos-
ing the communication to Man-in-the-Middle attacks (T1 - Man in the Middle) [The19c] and
consequently to the stealing of the token. Furthermore, as the lifetime of the access token is
unbounded, the attack surface increases, since it enables an unlimited and unrestricted usage of
stolen tokens.
Regarding the security of the publish/subscribe model adopted by NBI, our findings suggest that
NBI does not enforce any restriction on the creation and subscription to topics, thus allowing any
application to potentially subscribe to topics created by any other application or service of the
Fog Node. This behaviour is also suggested by the official Cisco documentation that describes a
way to subscribe to all sensors of the Fog node [Cis19a].
To prove that, we developed and installed a malicious Fog application (i.e., evilapp) implement-
ing some of the attacks discussed in [ARH17]. In details, the malicious application was able to
sniff all the data (T2 - Sniffing Attack) [The19b] transmitted on all the available topics, by exploit-
ing the wildcard character. In addition to this, we also discovered that our malicious application
was able to publish fake data (T3 - Data Manipulation) on any existing topic. For instance, the
above activity allows the attacker to inject false information, (T3.1 - Data Injection), cause unau-
thorised alteration of data (T3.2 - Data Tampering), re-transmit legitimate packets (T3.3 - Replay
Attack), send unexpected verbs or input values (T3.4 - Inject Unexpected Items) to the involved
components.
Finally, for the same reason, a malicious application can publish fake messages assuming the
identity of some other components of the system (T4 - Identity Spoofing) [The19a].
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4.4 Methodology
As described in the previous section, the actual implementation of the NBI service suffers from
several weaknesses. Some of them can be solved by adopting proper state-of-the-art solutions
for managing tokens expiration, MAC tokens, and trusted certificates.
In this respect, the scientific community has proposed several solutions for the MQTT protocol i)
to improve end-to-end encryption (e.g., [SCC19] and [MNE`17]), ii) to enhance authentication
and authorization mechanisms (e.g., [NIP`16] and [CPVV18]), or iii) to introduce access control
mechanisms (e.g., [CF18] and [LMMM`17]).
Furthermore, some implementations of the MQTT standard can improve the reliability of the
publish/subscribe paradigm. For instance, Mosquitto [Ecl19] and HiveMQ [Hiv19] implementa-
tions support the verification of SSL/TLS certificates as well as some basic authorization mech-
anisms.
Unfortunately, previous solutions still represent an unsatisfactory remediation, since the Fog
environment requires a message broker supporting stateful and fine-grained policies, e.g., based
on message content or depending on the current state of the Fog ecosystem. Furthermore, such
a broker has to be well-integrated with the other existing components, e.g., the implemented
authentication layer.
In this section, we present an extension of the standard NBI and an embedded run-time en-
forcement methodology called DIOXIN (Discerning IOx INterface), that is able to supervise the
interaction among Fog application components according to a set of security rules.
4.4.1 Overview of the approach
Figure 4.9 depicts the abstract workflow of DIOXIN. The workflow activates once the standard
NBI receives a message, and it is executed before carrying out the requested action.
In the first task, a component, namely the NBI Message Adapter (MA), encapsulates the original
message according to an ad-hoc format named NBI Message Schema. Briefly, MA extends each
message with a set of metadata collected from the request made by the sender (e.g., the identity
of the sender and the details on the topic). The extended NBI message is then delivered to the
NBI Policy Decision Point (PDP). In details, PDP evaluates the incoming request according to
a set of security policies that depends on iq the specific features of the message, i.e., scopes, iiq
the overall state of the running Fog ecosystem, i.e., the context, and iiiq the content of the NBI
message. This task completes by returning an authorization decision, i.e. deny, allow, or log,
related to the requested action.
Finally, the authorization decision is enforced by the NBI Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), which
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Figure 4.9: The workflow of DIOXIN.
denies (i.e., the message is discarded), allows (i.e., the original message is sent to the standard





3. "title": "NBI Message",
4. "type": "object",
5. "properties": {
6. "topic": {"type": "string"},
7. "senderId": {"type": "array"},
8. "action": {"type": "string", "enum": ["create", "delete", "
ãÑ publish", "subscribe"},
9. "timestamp": {"type": "string"},
10. "message": { "type": "object"}}}
Figure 4.10: The JSON schema of an NBI message.
NBI MA creates a new JSON message according to the NBI Message Schema, represented in
Figure 4.10.
The schema, named NBI Message (line 3), has an unique identifier (line 1) and follows the
draft-08 version (line 2) of the JSON Schema.
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In detail, a message contains a JSON object (line 4) with the following properties (line 5-13).
• Message topic. The topic property (line 6) must contain a string with the identifier of
the topic of a message.
• Sender identifier. The senderId property (line 7) must contain an array of strings with
the unique identifier and the aliases of the sender.
• Timestamp. The timestamp property (line 8) refers to the creation time of the NBI
message.
• Action. The action property (line 8) must contain the client requested action, i.e.,
publish a message or subscribe to a topic.
• Message content. The message property (line 10) contains an object related to the origi-
nal JSON message. Creating and deleting a topic does not apply to messages and, in such
instances, this property can be empty. Moreover, notice that any property prop of the
original message can be still accessed through the path message.prop3.
We stress that DIOXIN sets the properties of an NBI Message only after the original request is
delivered to NBI, thus minimizing the risk of being tampered by an external entity (see T3 in
Section 4.3.2).
Example 11. Consider the malicious application evilapp, introduced in 4.3.2, installed and
running on the Fog node. This application can exploit T2 (see Section 4.3.2) and sniff messages
related to the soil sensor (see Figure 4.7). Then, the application publishes the sniffed message
with a manipulated moisture value and exploits T3 (see Section 4.3.2).
Figure 4.11 shows the message published by evilapp after it is extended by the MA. In particular,
the original message is copied in the message property (line 4-11) and the senderId property
(line 2) contains the client_id and the application name of the evilapp. Notice that, instead
of the original message, it is now clear that an external application is trying to interact with the
irrigation system.
Message PDP
The Message PDP evaluates a list of enforceable policy rules and returns an authorization deci-
sion against an NBI Message.
The general form of a policy rule is defined as follows.
3We use the JavaScript dot notation for accessing JSON objects
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1. {"topic": "Moisture",









11. "message": [{"values": [90]}]}}
Figure 4.11: A message extended according to the NBI Message Schema.
<result> IF (<test>)
The main task of the PDP is evaluating the test predicate and, if it is true, returning the corre-
sponding result. In particular, a result can be a list of predefined expressions which amount to
iq adding a scope to the message (scope policy rule), iiq updating a value in the context (context
policy rule), and iiiq returning an authorization decision (authorization policy rule).
Similarly, a test predicate can be expressed according to iq he scopes of the NBI message, iiq
the values in the context, and iiiq a property value in the NBI message. Below we give a detail
of each class of policy rule.
Scope policy rule A scope is an identifier used for labelling messages. It represents a logical
way to characterise messages according to common properties like, e.g., values from PLCs or
sensitive devices.
Example 12. We want to label messages related to the field devices of the irrigation system,
i.e., the moisture sensor PLC1 and the irrigator IRRIGATOR, with the IRRIGSYS scope.
1. SCOPE.push("IRRIGSYS") IF (message.context.deviceId == "PLC1" OR
message.context.deviceId == "IRRIGATOR")
The above scope policy rule adds the IRRIGSYS scope to all the NBI messages containing a
property context.deviceId with PLC1 or IRRIGATOR as value in the original message,
according to the data schema of devices (see Figure 4.6).
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Context policy rule The Message PDP keeps a database of global variables, namely the con-
text, representing the state of the Fog system. The values of the context variables depend on the
content of the incoming NBI messages. To identify a message containing the value of a context
variable, we use context policy rules.
Example 13. We want to save the value of the moisture in the CTX context array. This allows
creating policy rules depending on its actual value.
2. save_value(CTX["moisture"], message.message[0].values[0]) IF (
topic == "Moisture" AND SCOPE.includes("IRRIGSYS") AND message.
context.dataSchemaId == "MoistureSchema")
The above context policy rule saves the value of the moisture, included in the original message,
in the moisture index of the CTX array if the message iq has been published in the Moisture
topic, iiq contains IRRIGSYS in its scopes (see Example 12), and iiiq has a MoistureSchema
as data schema (see Figure 4.6), i.e., it has been generated by a moisture sensor of the irrigation
system. The save_value represents an internal function that updates the context if and only if
the timestamp of the message is more recent than the one associated with the value of the context
variable.
Authorization policy rule The clause of an authorization policy rule determines if a requested
action, i.e., publish, subscribe, create or delete a topic, could be authorized (allow), denied (deny)
or authorized and logged (log).
The design of such policy rules depends on a global policy, namely the default policy, which
determines what happens when an input message does not match any other rule. If the default
policy is deny, then the authorization policy rules will define allowed actions and vice versa.
Example 14. Consider a default deny policy. We want to enforce allowed actions on the
Moisture topic.
3. ALLOW IF (topic == "Moisture" AND senderId == "Modbus TCP")
4. ALLOW IF (topic == "Moisture" AND action == "subscribe" AND
senderId == "Irrigation App")
5. ALLOW IF (topic == "Moisture" AND SCOPE.includes("IRRIGSYS") AND
action == "publish" AND senderId == "Irrigation App" AND CTX["
moisture"] < 30)
In the above three policy rules, the first allows any action if the message comes from the Modbus
TCP service, i.e, this service can publish values read from sensors and receive messages contain-
ing commands for field devices. The second states that the Irrigation App can subscribe
to the Moisture topic and receive messages about the moisture sensor.
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Figure 4.12: The architecture of DIOXIN implemented on Cisco IOx.
The last allows the Irrigation App to publish messages on the Moisture topic, i.e., start
the watering, if and only if the scope of the message is related to the irrigation system and the
actual value of the moisture is less than a fixed value.
Message PEP
The NBI PEP receives the NBI Message and the related authorization decision from the NBI
PDP. Therefore, it executes a corresponding action. If the authorization decision is deny, the
NBI PEP discards the message, creates a log entry about this violation, and return an error code
to the sender. If the authorization decision is allow or log, the NBI PEP extracts the original
message from the NBI message and sends it to the standard NBI for following the ordinary flow.
Also, if the authorization decision is log, the NBI PEP creates a log entry related to the message.
Example 15. Consider the evilapp application described in Example 11 and the rules introduced
in Examples 12, 13, and 14. If we enforce a default deny policy, the evilapp can not sniff and
publish messages because any of the allow rules matches her senderId. For this reason, the
NBI PEP blocks and logs the evilapp attempts to exploit T2 and T3.
4.4.2 Implementation
We present here a proof-of-concept implementation of DIOXIN on Cisco IOx devices.
Briefly, it includes an extension of the standard NBI which embeds the NBI MA and NBI PEP
modules, and a new component running the PDP module (see Figure 4.12). As described in
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Section 4.1.3, the NBI service runs inside the IOx services package provided by Cisco. In partic-
ular, this package consists of a Linux container hosting a LUA [IDFF96] web application. This
application provides the HTTP endpoints for Fog Applications interacting with the NBI and im-
plements the publish/subscribe and create/delete topic actions (see Section 4.1.4). Therefore, we
added inside the LUA code a new function being called before the standard request handlers exe-
cute the actions required by Fog applications. The above function performs the activities related
to the NBI MA and NBI PEP, namely:
1. It receives as input the message sent by an application along with the bearer token used for
authentication.
2. It executes the existing authentication procedure with the IOx OAuth server and extracts
the client_id of the authenticated application from the response.
3. It uses the client_id together with the topic, the requested action, and the timestamp,
and creates the NBI Message (see Section 4.4.1).
4. It requests the evaluation of the NBI Message by sending an HTTPS request to the NBI
PDP.
5. If the PDP returns deny as an answer, the PEP sends back a forbidden answer to the
Fog Application. Otherwise, it invokes the standard request handlers with the original
message. Moreover, if a log request is returned, the function also writes a message to the
IOx Syslog.
The PDP component is implemented through the Open Policy Agent (OPA) project [Sty19].
OPA is a general-purpose policy engine and it can be used for authorization, admission con-
trol, and also for data filtering. In particular, OPA allows reasoning about data represented in
structured JSON documents, and it is then suitable for evaluating NBI messages. OPA policies
can be expressed using the Rego language [Sty19], which is a declarative language based on
Datalog [CGT89].
We execute the OPA as a standalone server in a Linux container running inside IOx. In such a
configuration, it can be queried for policy evaluation using HTTPS requests. In particular, the
OPA server executes the following tasks:
1. It receives an NBI Message from the NBI.
2. It loads the Rego policies and context variables from the local repositories.
3. It creates scopes for the received NBI Message, updates the values of context variables,
and evaluates the authorization policies against the NBI message.
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4. It updates the context repository and returns an authorization decision to the NBI PEP. If
required, it writes a log entry.
1. default allow = false
2. scopes[scope] { # Rule 1.
3. scope := "IRRIGSYS"
4. plc := ["PLC1", "IRRIGATOR"]
5. plc[_] == input.message.context.deviceId}
6. context[ctx] { # Rule 2.
7. input.topic == "Moisture"
8. scopes[_] == "IRRIGSYS"
9. input.message.context.dataSchemaId == "MoistureSchema"
10. ts := to_number(input.message.context.timestamp)
11. ctx := ctx_value("moisture", {"ts": ts, "value": input.message.
ãÑ message[0].values[0] })}
12. allow = true { # Rule 3.
13. context
14. input.topic == "Moisture"
15. input.senderId[_] == "Modbus TCP"}
16. allow = true { # Rule 4.
17. context
18. input.topic == "Moisture"
19. input.action == "subscribe"
20. input.senderId[_] == "Irrigation App"}
21. allow = true { # Rule 5.
22. input.topic == "Moisture"
23. scopes[_] == "IRRIGSYS"
24. input.action == "subscribe"
25. input.senderId[_] == "Irrigation App"
26. context["moisture"]["value"] < 30}
Figure 4.13: An example of Rego policy.
Example 16. Consider the rules introduced in Examples 12, 13, and 14. Figure 4.13 represents
a translation of the above rules in the Rego language. Briefly, line 1 declares the default policy,
i.e., a default deny configuration. Lines 2-5 represent a scope policy rule. It is expressed as a
partial rule [Sty19], i.e., a statement that generates a value in the rule head (line 2) to be assigned
to the scopes variable. This variable contains the set of message scopes. The rule body (line
4-5) checks for values of message properties according to constraints described in Examples 12.
Lines 6-11 represent a partial rule used for context policy rules. In particular, ctx_value (line
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11) is an internal function that updates the context variable with the moisture value if and
only if the timestamp of the message is more recent than the saved one. Lines 14-26 represent
authorization policy rules. Their heads (lines 12, 16, and 21) override the default deny value of
the allow variable. The bodies (lines 15-16, 19-21, and 24-28) check the constraints described
in Example 14. In particular, line 28 checks whether the actual value of the moisture, saved in









9. "scopes": [ "IRRIGSYS" ]}}]}]}
Figure 4.14: An example of OPA answer.
Example 17. Consider the legitimate Modbus TCP application reading the moisture value
from the soil sensor and publishing it to the Moisture topic. Figure 4.14 depicts the answer
from the OPA server. The message is authorized (line 4) since it matches rule 3 (line 12 of
Figure 4.13). The answer also contains the updated context (line 5) and the scopes (line 9)
related to the message.
4.4.3 Experimental Evaluation
We use SDL to design the scenario described in Section 4.2.2. The specification substantially
relies on the elements used in Section 3.5. The main difference is that we introduce the new types
(i.e., Software.PLC.ModBusTCP.Linux.Moisture, and Software.PLC.ModBusTCP.
Linux.Irrigator) for simulating PLCs. We implement the above components using Python
and the pyModbus [Rip20] library. The entire SDL specification and the source code of the new
components are available on GitHub [Rus20a]. Finally, we deploy a running instance of the
testbed using CRACK.
We carried out two sets of experiments by executing evilapp on the irrigation system in place, in
order to empirically assess both the reliability and the performance of DIOXIN.
In the first set of experiments, we executed evilapp on a standard IOx deployment, i.e., using
only the native NBI implementation provided by Cisco.
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Table 4.1: NBI Response Time in milliseconds.
Default DIOXIN
NBI Response Time PDP Response Time NBI Response Time
denied allowed
T1 448 47 339 460
T3/T4 409 46 286 433
In the second set of experiments we run evilapp after activating DIOXIN. Moreover, we intro-
duced 2 scope, 1 context, and 9 authorization rules according to a default-deny policy. The scope
rules label messages sent to the field devices and the remote cloud. The context rule save the
actual value of the moisture level. The authorization rules define iq the admitted topic, iiq appli-
cations that can subscribe and publish on these topics, iiiq the message format, i.e., valid data
types and values, and ivq the soundness of messages concerning the saved moisture level and the
freshness of their timestamp. The whole set of rules amounts to 86 Rego lines of code.
In both sets of experiments we used the malicious application executing 1000 repetitions of T2
attacks, i.e., subscribing to existing topics and tapping published messages, and 1000 repetitions
of T3/T4 attacks, i.e., publishing messages to existing topics (see Section 4.3.2).
In the first set, we observed that the NBI accepted all legitimate and malicious messages. More-
over, we extracted the NBI response time for each message from the log of all requests.
In the second set, the experiments confirmed that the activation of DIOXIN denied all the mali-
cious messages and allowed only legitimate requests. Table 4.1 shows the 90th-percentile of the
PDP response time and the NBI response time for denied and allowed messages during the two
repetitions of attacks.
Analyzing the PDP response time, we can observe that it represents on average 10% of the NBI
response time. This implies that introducing DIOXIN generates a low overhead, even if NBI
receives only allowed messages.
Below we answer the research question of Section 1.2.3.
Answer to RQ6 We believe that Cyber Range can support the security assessment of critical
assets. As a matter of fact, we created a realistic scenario for Fog Computing extending the IT
infrastructure introduced in Section 3.1 and hosted by a Cyber Range. CRACK supported us in
updating the infrastructure by reusing most of the existing components and adding the emulated
PLCs. The resulting scenario has become a testbed for Fog Computing, merely connecting the
physical Fog device under testing to a virtual network provided by the Cyber Range. This setup
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allowed us to perform an extensive and intrusive security assessment without impacting produc-
tion environments. Moreover, we used the Cyber Range for testing the solution we propose to




In this chapter, we firstly present the related work concerning the ZenHackAdemy experience
(see Section 5.1). In Section 5.2, we compare our proposal for Next Generation Cyber Ranges
against other frameworks presented in the literature. Finally, in Section 5.3, we detail the related
work about other solutions for policy enforcement in Fog Computing.
5.1 Hands-on and CTFs
The USENIX Workshops on Advances in Security Education constitutes an important venue to
share educational experiences in the field of cybersecurity. Indeed, the workshops’ papers intro-
duce several case-studies on educational activities similar to ours. In many cases, gamification
methodologies and techniques were selected to present cybersecurity scenarios, asking students
to find possible solutions.
[CdR16] discusses an 11-week course addressing IoT security. Like in our case, each week
presents a single topic, such as network protocols, web security, reverse engineering. During
the course, students discovered a large number of vulnerabilities hidden inside the devices under
analysis, and they learned how to carry on penetration testing activities on a set of unknown
devices and programs. Another paper [CHRT17], of the same research group, proposes an ex-
periment based on gamification. During an 11-week cybersecurity course, students played the
role of newly hired IT security employees in charge of different tasks, presented as CTF-like
exercises. Each exercise offers the chance to choose different options for advancing into the plot
of the game. Depending on what the students decide, the plot evolves, and changes accordingly.
Authors state that those students who actively followed the narration offered by the game scored
better, as opposed to those who ignored the suggestions.
The goal of [VB16] is to understand the impact of the hints and the solutions given to the stu-
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Table 5.1: Comparison with the related work.
E M V T C S
ALPACA [ECGB19] è ○ ○ + ○ +
EDURange [WBS`15] è ○ + + ○ ○
KYPO [VVO`17] ○ ○ + + ○ ○
CyRIS [BPT`18] ○ ○ + + + ○
ADLES [CdLGHK18] ○ ○ è + è ○
SecGen [SSSAK`17] ○ ○ + + ○ ○
EZSetup [LNX17] ○ ○ + + è ○
Tele-lab [WM12] ○ ○ + + + +
Labtainers [TI18] è + + + ○ +
DETER [PR10] è è + + + ○
CRACK ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
dents who approach cybersecurity challenges. Actions performed by the students on the training
platform were logged, producing data that were later analyzed. Results show that there was no
evident correlation between the success rate of a challenge and the hints provided.
Flushman et al. [FGP15] set up a 10-week course, split into different modules. Each module cov-
ers a different cybersecurity topic. Students are organized in groups of four, mimicking a regular
CTF team, and they play an Alternate Reality Game. Each exercise is provided with a fictional
situation, blurring the boundary between the challenge and the inspired real-life scenario. At the
end of each challenge, students are asked to reflect on their individual experience. These data
have been used by the organizers to monitor the behavior of the participants and to discover prob-
lems in the hosting platform. Like in our experience, results show how gamification improved
students’ performances and awareness of computer security.
5.2 Cyber Ranges
The growing demand for cyber security professionals with hands-on skills is boosting the de-
velopment of Cyber Ranges as well as training environments in general. In [YKG20] present
a survey of Cyber Ranges and security testbeds. There, they also provide a taxonomy and an
architectural model of a generic Cyber Range. CRACK (see Section 3.2.1) complies with their
architectural requirements. Moreover, they mention a number of facilities, e.g., random traffic
generators, that, although not yet implemented in CRACK, are compatible with our proposal.
In terms of exercises executed on a Cyber Range, Locked Shields [CCD19] is possibly the most
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famous initiative. It is an annual event relying on a large, complex, and heterogeneous scenario.
Locked Shields [CCD19] is probably the most famous live-fire exercise based on a Cyber Range.
It is an annual event that leverages a large, complex, and heterogeneous scenario. The design
phase of this exercise is based on a theater that is updated every year. While the execution
phase lasts for a few days only, both design and testing require the effort of many experts for
several months. Locked Shields is possibly the archetype of the Cyber Ranges relying on manual
scenario development. As such, it matches the application conditions of CRACK, and thus, it is
not an alternative to our approach.
Below, we compare CRACK against other frameworks presented in the literature in terms of the
main features of CRACK, which we recall below.
• Extensible (E). The framework supports the seamless integration of new elements (e.g.,
vulnerabilities, software, and hardware).
• Modular (M). The elements defined within the framework can be composed without cus-
tomizing them.
• Verifiable (V). The framework includes an engine for formally verifying the scenarios, e.g.,
the reachability of a target.
• Testable (T). The framework includes an engine for testing the scenarios, e.g., the ex-
ploitability of a vulnerability.
• Compatible (C). The framework relies on standard/well-established infrastructure devel-
opment methodologies that are widely supported, e.g., TOSCA and Docker.
• Scalable (S). The framework allows for the definition of scenarios of different sizes, e.g.,
in terms of number of machines, and it scales with them.
We summarize the comparison results in Table 5.1. For each framework, we use ○ and + to
denote whether the feature is present or not, respectively. Moreover, we use è to indicate that
the feature is only partially present.
ALPACA [ECGB19] creates training scenarios involving multiple vulnerabilities. In particular, it
uses a Prolog-based engine to generate a single virtual machine containing a set of vulnerabilities
selected from a database. Vulnerabilities are organized according to a dependency lattice to
ensure that an actual exploit exists. Unlike CRACK, ALPACA does not include a testing phase.
Thus, when a new vulnerability is defined, to preserve the validity of the new scenarios, the
entire lattice must be updated. It relies on a custom specification language, which is compiled to
generate Ansible and Packer scripts.
EDURange [WBS`15] is a cloud-based framework for hosting cybersecurity scenarios. It also
relies on a YAML-based specification language (inspired by the scenario description language
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of [Fit14]) for designing cyber exercises. Analogously to our SDL, their language includes prim-
itive types for modeling, e.g., software, artifacts, constraints, objectives, and actors. However,
unlike our SDL, their language neither includes the notion of vulnerability nor supports the ver-
ification and testing of the scenarios. Finally, EDURange uses Terraform for the deployment
phase.
The KYPO Cyber Range [VOC`17] uses structured JSON files for specifying goals, network
topology, software, and scenario workflows. Each specification is translated to Ansible and Pup-
pet scripts. Moreover, KYPO includes several predefined templates covering different categories
of cybersecurity scenarios, e.g., Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) and phishing attacks. Ver-
ification and testing of the scenarios are not supported.
CyRIS [BPT`18] is a tool for the generation and management of cyber exercises. It also uses
a YAML-based language for specifying users, firewall rules, and software running on each ma-
chine. CyRIS uses its own, customized engine for creating the virtual infrastructure. Finally,
scenarios are neither verified nor tested.
ADLES [CdLGHK18] is a framework for reducing the effort of building, modifying, and de-
ploying the virtual environments for cyber exercises. Also ADLES relies on a YAML-based
specification language, but it compiles blueprints by means of a customized engine. Moreover,
in the design stage, the authors claim a specification check phase performing several semantic
checks. However, the details provided do not allow to outline if the framework is fully verifiable.
Instead, testing of scenarios is not supported.
SecGen [SSSAK`17] creates vulnerable virtual machines to be used for learning penetration
testing techniques. It includes a catalog of vulnerabilities that can be randomly selected based
on constraints within the scenario definition. It uses an XML-based configuration language and
leverages Puppet and Vagrant to provide the required virtual machines. Verification and testing
of the scenarios are not supported by SecGen.
EZSetup [LNX17] is a web-based tool for creating and managing virtual environments for cy-
bersecurity exercises. It relies on a YAML-based specification language for defining the network
layout and connected virtual machines. By relying on an internal engine, EZSetup deploys the
specified infrastructure on some cloud provider (among a set of supported ones). Then, an Ansi-
ble script is manually written to customize each virtual machine. Instead, verification and testing
of exercises are not supported.
Tele-lab [WM12] is a platform for cyber security training using virtual labs. A virtual lab is a
single virtual machine where the exercise is dynamically deployed. In particular, the designer
defines a program, called agent, that manages the deployment by applying some parameters
contained in an XML specification. Virtual labs and exercises are neither verified nor tested.
Labtainers [TI18] is a framework for creating and deploying Docker containers that host cyberse-
curity exercises. Each exercise is designed through an ad hoc scripting language. The language
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allows specifying an indicator, i.e., a goal condition that is automatically checked at runtime.
Labtainers exercises are executed on a single machine and they are neither verified not tested.
DETER [PR10] is a large scale, physical infrastructure consisting of a group of federated labo-
ratories. The infrastructure is meant to execute security testbeds. DETER is managed through
a YAML-based configuration language that has been used for defining complex cybersecurity
training session. Again, no verification and testing operations are carried out by the framework.
Apart from the proposal described above, some other authors propose frameworks for helping
the organization of Attack/Defense (A/D) Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions. For instance,
SWPAG [TDG`17b] is a tool that provides a web interface for rapidly deploying an infrastructure
for hosting A/D CTFs in the cloud. [RAPA16] works similarly, but it leverages application
containers.
This kind of CTFs resembles the exercises played in a Cyber Range and their organization shares
some of the issues discussed in this work. However, A/D CTFs are not executed on an arbitrarily
complex infrastructure. Rather, they run on a dedicated platform designed to allow the par-
ticipating teams to fairly compete by reciprocally attacking. For instance, a typical A/D CTF
configuration consists of the same, vulnerable machine shared by all the teams. Each team looks
for vulnerabilities that they can patch on their own machine and exploit on the others. Since this
is a particular scenario, CRACK can be used to model and deploy it. Instead, CTF frameworks
cannot be trivially extended to general purpose scenarios.
5.3 Fog Security
Since Fog Computing is an extension of the Cloud paradigm towards the edge, it inherits a
combination of both Cloud and network security and privacy challenges (see, e.g., [RLM18,
AAHC17, MM11]). Among them, the security of the interaction among Fog applications has
driven the attention of the scientific community, mostly from an access control point of view
[ZLY`18]. For example, [SMG15] theorized a distributed RMAC scheme for Fog Computing.
In this scheme, security policies and attributes are preserved in a distributed policy information
point (PIP) placed in the Cloud and the policy decision points (PDPs), that are in charge of
making decision according to the access control policy, are implemented on Fog devices; the
policy enforcement point (PEP), that enforces the access decisions, are instead implemented on
the edge of the network.
Furthermore, [FWW`17] point out that Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) can
help to achieve data access control in fog-cloud systems. Hence, the authors propose an access
control scheme based on a verifiable outsourced multi-authority.
However, one of the most relevant examples is the policy-based resource access control frame-
work proposed by [DAT14], that adopts the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
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to define formalized and refined operational, security and network policy specifications. How-
ever, the proposal is just a preliminary framework which does not include a lot of details regard-
ing how to i) build the policy repository, ii) identify a user, iii) take a decision, and iii) protect
the identity and grant data privacy. Furthermore, this work requires the inclusion of additional
dedicated resources within Fog nodes that may introduce some operational latency and are weak
against DoS attacks [KPQ17].
Similarly, [NPT18] propose a Model-Driven Security policy enforcement framework, named
MDSioT, for IoT tenant apps deployed at the Edge layer. The framework allows generating se-
curity enforcement code, called gatekeepers, for different kinds of IoT tenant apps, and deploying
a tenant app with its corresponding gatekeeper, that acts as a local PDP-PEP, in the edge server.
Although promising, MDSioT requires substantial architectural changes, e.g., the introduction of
an intermediate layer to intercept requests using the gatekeeper patterns, and it is mainly focused
on architectural designs, policy modeling, and engineering approach without a definition of the
run-time monitoring solution.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first methodology for the run-time enforcement of




In this thesis, we deal with the design and implementation of Next Generation Cyber Ranges. We
started introducing the Cyber Security Skills Shortage and the need to reduce this gap through
training sessions that cover hands-on activities. For this reason, we considered the CTF compe-
titions. To prove their effectiveness, we proposed to computer science and computer engineering
students of our department a training activity, outside formal classes, involving CTF challenges.
After two years of experience, we observed that this type of practical training attracts students.
Moreover, we can claim that these activities raised their awareness of different aspects of Com-
puter Security.
A Cyber Range can host CTF challenges and execute more complex and even more practical
exercises to support training in large organizations. In particular, the overall quality of such ex-
ercises relies on a good design of the training scenario. To this aim, we presented CRACK, an
open-source tool for modeling, verifying, and testing the scenarios for a Cyber Range. CRACK
relies on the Scenario Definition Language (SDL), an extension of TOSCA that introduces sev-
eral, new features. For instance, we defined novel types for modeling, e.g., vulnerabilities and
goals, and a Datalog semantics. The Datalog translation enables the verification of the scenario
and generates proof traces that drive the automatic testing process.
A further application of Cyber Ranges is creating testbeds for evaluating architecture and testing
new security products in a controlled environment. In this work, we use a Cyber Range for
executing a security assessment of Cisco IOx, a mainstream operating system for the emerging
Fog Computing paradigm. We showed the inadequacy of current security mechanisms in IOx
for actual Fog deployments. Then, we enhanced the native security mechanisms to support the
runtime enforcement of user-defined security policies. Finally, we tested our proposal using the
Cyber Range again. In this way, we were able to verify the effectiveness of our solution and the
reduction of the attack surface for a IOx related deployment.
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